Please report a suspected vulnerability privately, through GitHub's Security Advisory form. Do not open a public issue for it: an issue discloses the problem before a fix exists. For a defect that is not a vulnerability (a wrong result, a crash on valid input), a normal issue is the right place.
This extension operates within DuckDB's process and has no independent attack surface beyond what DuckDB itself exposes. Specifically:
- No network access -- the extension makes zero network calls at runtime
- No file system access -- all state is managed in-memory through DuckDB's aggregate function lifecycle
- No dynamic code execution -- pattern strings are parsed by a deterministic recursive descent parser with no eval-like behavior
All hand-written unsafe code is confined to src/ffi/ (10 files); the
extension entry point in src/lib.rs is generated by the
quack_rs::entry_point_v2! macro. Business logic in
src/sessionize.rs, src/retention.rs, src/window_funnel.rs,
src/sequence.rs, src/sequence_next_node.rs, src/common/, and
src/pattern/ is 100% safe Rust. The compiler and clippy enforce this:
unsafe_code = "deny" everywhere but src/ffi, and in src/ffi
clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks and clippy::multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block
are denied, so every unsafe block is one operation with a // SAFETY:
note. The callbacks themselves are safe Rust over the small types in
src/ffi/view.rs, which hold the few unsafe constructors and bounds-check
every row index. The aggregate update, combine, and finalize callbacks
are generated by quack-rs's aggregate_*_callback! macros, which turn a panic
into a SQL error instead of crashing DuckDB (the release profile keeps
panic = "unwind" for this).
The extension has exactly three runtime dependencies: quack-rs = "=0.20.0"
and libduckdb-sys = "=1.20000.1" (both pinned exactly) and smallvec = "1"
(a caret requirement, locked by Cargo.lock). All dependencies are audited via
cargo-deny in CI, and weekly by scheduled.yml, for known advisories and
license compliance.
Release builds use deterministic settings (LTO, single codegen unit, Cargo.lock
committed). Release artifacts include SHA256 checksums and GitHub artifact
attestations via actions/attest-build-provenance.
For the full security model, see the Security & Supply Chain documentation.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.11.x | Yes |
| < 0.11 | No |