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Security: kusari-oss/mikebom

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for vulnerabilities. Report them privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

https://github.com/kusari-sandbox/mikebom/security/advisories/new

This routes the report to the maintainers without exposing it publicly.

What to expect

  • Acknowledgment within 7 days of report.
  • Triage decision (accepted / declined / needs-more-info) within 14 days.
  • Fix or detailed status update within 30 days.

Coordinated disclosure timelines can be negotiated case-by-case if a fix requires longer (e.g., a deep refactor or upstream dependency update).

Supported versions

mikebom is pre-1.0 alpha. Only the most recent alpha release is supported for security fixes. SemVer guarantees do not apply until 1.0.

Version Supported
latest alpha ✅ yes
older alphas ❌ no
1.0 and beyond (policy TBD at 1.0)

Scope

In scope:

  • Crashes, hangs, or memory-safety issues during scan / verify / trace.
  • SBOM emission that misrepresents the underlying observed evidence (e.g., a component reported as present that wasn't observed in the trace, or vice versa — this contradicts Constitution Principles VIII
    • IX at .specify/memory/constitution.md).
  • Attestation verification failures that incorrectly accept malformed, expired, or revoked signatures.
  • Privilege-escalation or container-escape via the eBPF tracer.
  • Path-traversal, command-injection, or arbitrary-file-write in scan modes that consume operator-controlled paths.

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in mikebom's upstream Rust crate dependencies — those go through normal CVE channels and are tracked by the Kusari Inspector CI gate that runs on every PR. If you've found a dependency CVE you believe mikebom is exposed to, please mention it in an advisory anyway — we'd rather have a duplicate than miss one.
  • Bugs that produce wrong SBOM output without a security implication (those should be filed as regular GitHub issues).
  • Denial-of-service via legitimate-but-large inputs (e.g., a 10 GB container layer that exhausts memory). Resource-exhaustion mitigations are tracked as ordinary issues.

There aren't any published security advisories