Terax runs shells, reads/writes files, and talks to AI providers, so security bugs matter. If you find one, please tell us before posting it publicly.
Email security@terax.app. Include:
- What the issue is and what it lets an attacker do
- Steps to reproduce (a small PoC is great)
- Version, OS, arch
We'll get back to you within a few days. Once it's fixed, we'll credit you in the release notes - unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
Please don't open a public GitHub issue for security reports.
Until 1.0.0, only the latest minor gets security fixes. See the current version in package.json or on the Releases page.
- The Rust backend in
src-tauri/(PTY, FS, IPC, plugins) - The frontend in
src/- anywhere untrusted input lands (terminal output, file content, AI tool results, credentials) - Release artifacts on GitHub and
terax.app - The auto-updater
- Bugs in upstream deps (Tauri, xterm.js, CodeMirror, AI SDKs…) - report those upstream. We'll ship the fix once it's released.
- Anything that needs an already-compromised machine or a local attacker with shell access
- Older versions (
< 0.5)
- API keys live in the OS keychain via
keyring- not on disk, not inlocalStorage, not in logs. - No telemetry. Terax only talks to the network when you ask it to (AI requests, update checks, web preview).
- AI tool approval. File writes and shell commands from the agent need your OK before they run.
- No Node in the renderer. The frontend only reaches the host through the allow-listed Tauri commands.
- Signed releases. Updates are verified before they're applied.
- Terax runs whatever you (or the agent) tell it to run, with your permissions. That's kind of the point of a terminal.
- AI providers see whatever you send them. Read their retention policies.
- Local LLM endpoints (LM Studio, OpenAI-compatible) are trusted at the network level - only point Terax at servers you control.