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TCOP: Receiver-Bound Runtime Evidence for Cross-Domain Agent Authorization

TCOP is a protocol for carrying signed, scoped, time-bounded runtime evidence from an observing domain to the local authorization boundary of a receiving domain. Before that evidence can affect a pending agent action, the receiver validates provenance, freshness, replay state, receipt correlation, subject, resource namespace, capability, and scope against its own state. The receiver then creates the authorization decision under its own policy.

This repository is the reference implementation and sealed evidence package for the final USENIX Security 2027 paper, TCOP: Receiver-Bound Runtime Evidence for Cross-Domain Agent Authorization. It is organized so reviewers can inspect the evidence-to-authorization boundary, reproduce the credential-free results, and distinguish protocol behavior from the receiver strategies evaluated on top of it.

TCOP is not a remote kill switch, a detector, or a mandated containment strategy. It carries evidence. An imported TCX field never maps directly to allow, deny, quarantine, revoke, or suspend. The receiver alone chooses whether to reject, monitor, restrict, or otherwise handle accepted evidence.

The installed tcop command is the single interface for protocol validation, frozen-strategy certification, deterministic study reproduction, artifact review, safe local services, and observational administration.

TCOP protocol core ── deterministic experiments / artifact replay
                   ├─ local domain services / bounded-context gateway
                   └─ read-only operational diagnostics

Those modes share signing, TCX validation, receipt handling, frozen strategy adapters, local resolver behavior, and the gateway acceptance boundary. They differ only in clock, transport, persistence, telemetry, and local enforcement adapters. The gateway consumes a Domain-B-local policy and decision, never a remote enforcement instruction.

Consistency-revision results and claim boundary

Evidence Result What it supports
Matched synthetic containment Across 54 strict input-equivalent pairs, the containment-first receiver improved 30, left 24 unchanged, and worsened none. Harmful calls fell from 39 to 3, preventing 36 of 39 baseline calls. A causal comparison under matched frozen policy and synthetic scenarios, not deployment effectiveness.
TCX Validation-Value v2 Across 12 mixed actions, Exact Binding (C2) blocks 3 harmful actions and constrains none of 12 benign actions. The broad Arrival Guard (C1-class) blocks 7 harmful actions and constrains 7 benign actions; both block the 3 accepted binding-matched harmful actions. Receiver-side semantic binding, validation, hostile-peer handling, and correlation behavior.
Post-denial substitution replay Exact Binding forwards all 15 eligible substitutions. The evaluated receiver-local Campaign Correlation strategy blocks those substitutions and forwards the tested outside-campaign same-risk benign actions. A bounded strategy tradeoff, not mandatory TCOP behavior or a general escalation policy.
Campaign Correlation frontier (C2E artifact identifier) Across the predeclared 150-episode population, Campaign Correlation blocks campaign-linked harmful substitutions without restricting the tested outside-campaign benign actions. Deterministic strategy selectivity under declared receiver-local relations.
Full external-warning ledger The sealed 168-case population contains 72 attack-bearing and 96 benign source cases: 25 receiver-actionable exact bindings, 47 attack-bearing no-warning cases, and 96 benign no-warning cases. C1, C2, and Campaign Correlation block the 25 exact bindings; Standing Guard (C3) blocks all 72 attack-bearing cases and constrains all 96 benign cases. Conditional receiver authorization outcomes, not detector quality, warning prevalence, or deployment rates.

The protocol controls separately show that invalid signatures, wrong receipts, expired or replayed contexts, unauthorized peers, and action-like remote metadata create no receiver restriction. The single-environment reference path also records Domain-B-local policy and decision provenance for every gateway block.

These counts have different units of analysis, including strict pairs, validation episodes, replay treatments, and gateway calls. They are reported separately and must not be pooled.

It also contains a separate v0.2 deterministic witness profile. The profile adds receiver-classified control-group evidence, interaction receipts, provenance-preserving relays, passive peer witnesses, and safe active patrols without changing the frozen v0.1 path.

The separate v0.3 reliability profile adds receiver-local, scope-specific observer reliability, fixed-point weighted corroboration, probation, hysteresis, compromise windows, and accusation-cycle reporting. It reuses immutable v0.2 evidence and never creates a global reputation score.

The separate v0.4 confirmation profile adds a zero-credit investigative-tip channel, scoped provisional protection, independently auditable direct-local emergency evidence, source-novel confirmation, and deterministic campaign grouping. It consumes v0.2 evidence and v0.3 reliability projections without changing the frozen earlier profiles.

The separate v0.5 minimality profile is an analysis/composition layer over v0.1–v0.4. It evaluates declared coherent profiles, ablations, interactions, complexity, Pareto frontiers, and profile selection without adding a defense.

Paper reviewer quickstart

The paper asks whether signed cross-domain runtime evidence can reach a receiver in time to inform one pending local authorization decision, without giving the observing domain enforcement authority. Review starts from sealed artifacts, not a live model call or service.

python -m pip install -e .

# Default paper reproduction: Tier 0 source and paper checks, deterministic
# causal replay, and strict replay of frozen agent traces. No provider
# credential is read.
(cd paper/usenix27 && ./artifact/reproduce.sh --all-no-credentials)

# Verify the consistency-revision study roots directly through the public CLI.
tcop study validation-value verify --artifact-dir artifacts/tcx-validation-value-v2
tcop study adaptive-authorization verify --artifact-dir artifacts/adaptive-agent-authorization-v1
tcop study c2e-frontier verify --artifact-dir artifacts/c2e-frontier-v1
tcop study independent-warning-v2 verify \
  --artifact-dir artifacts/independent-warning-admission-v2-external-stratified
tcop study independent-warning-full verify \
  --artifact-dir artifacts/independent-warning-admission-v3-full-population

The default workflow is credential-free. It verifies source roots, regenerates paper-local data, figures, and tables, builds the paper, audits claims, numbers, and anonymity, reruns the deterministic core, and strictly replays frozen agent traces. Tier 3 can regenerate live traces with a separately configured provider credential, but is not needed for any causal claim and cannot replace frozen replay evidence.

Paper result Evidence root What to inspect
Single-environment reference-path deployment artifacts/v0.6-agent-validation-live-origin-certified reports/authorization-audit.json, reports/origin-federation-audit.json
Deterministic A1:A2 containment result artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6-evidence pairs/paired-results.jsonl, reports/paired-causal-comparison.json
Frozen live traces and causal replay artifacts/v0.6-agent-validation-live-origin-certified reports/trace-generation-summary.json, reports/paired-enforcement-results.json
Availability cost artifacts/v0.6-agent-validation-live-origin-certified reports/benign-workload-impact.json
TCX validation-value frontier artifacts/tcx-validation-value-v2 reports/condition-summary.json, reports/matching-harmful-summary.json, hostile-peer-results.csv, correlation-results.csv
Post-denial substitution replay artifacts/adaptive-agent-authorization-v1 reports/summary.json, decision-traces.jsonl
Campaign Correlation frontier (C2E artifact identifier) artifacts/c2e-frontier-v1 reports/frontier-summary.json, escalation-lifecycle.jsonl, c2e-field-use-traces.jsonl
Independent Warning Admission v2 artifacts/independent-warning-admission-v2-external-stratified reports/cohort-summary.json, reports/substitution-summary.json, candidate-ledger.csv
Full external-warning ledger artifacts/independent-warning-admission-v3-full-population reports/pipeline-coverage.json, reports/authorization-outcomes.json, candidate-ledger.csv

Every study root contains its own plan, manifest, normalized outputs, source or selection ledger where applicable, report, and verifier. The final paper preserves predecessor roots and amendment lineage; review the studies as separate evidence streams rather than pooling their denominators.

Repository scope

The reference framework includes:

  • signed, scoped, expiring runtime observations and strict receiver validation;
  • static trust-domain and observer authority configuration, append-only evidence storage, and JSONL exports;
  • deterministic simulation with replay, delay, partition, and Sybil fault cases, including the preserved v0.1–v0.5 regression path;
  • receiver-local capability envelopes, strategy certification, and separately rooted studies for validation value, timing, substitution, Campaign Correlation selectivity (artifact identifier C2E), and independent-warning admission; and
  • a bounded single-environment reference gateway and frozen live-trace replay path, alongside the credential-free deterministic evidence.

The protocol does not receive benchmark ground truth. Protocol, resolution, and benchmark-truth streams are stored separately to prevent oracle leakage.

CLI quick start

Install into a Python 3.11+ environment:

python -m pip install -e .
tcop --help

Review the immutable strategy compatibility boundary:

tcop strategy list
tcop strategy certify --all

Create a deterministic v0.2 protocol fixture and verify it with the same validator the local gateway uses:

tcop context create --observer observer-1 --trust-domain partner.example \
  --subject agent-1 --scope tool:data.export \
  --write /tmp/warning.tcx.json --receipt-write /tmp/receipt.json
tcop context verify /tmp/warning.tcx.json --receipt /tmp/receipt.json
tcop receipt verify /tmp/receipt.json --context /tmp/warning.tcx.json

For a practical, reviewer-scale v0.6 reproduction:

tcop study reproduce \
  --plan benchmark/studies/v0.6-federated.yaml \
  --selection core \
  --output artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6-core
tcop artifact verify artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6-core \
  --require-complete --require-replayable

The full pre-registered matrix uses --selection full. Individual stages are available through tcop study verify-inputs, matrix, run, replay, validate, and report; existing artifacts can be inspected or compared without running a study through tcop artifact.

The v0.6 missing-evidence round is a separate, receiver-only analysis layer: it audits strict A1/A2 causal pairs, receipt timing, the bounded central comparator, utility cost, and post-run forensic quality while preserving the completed federation artifact unchanged.

tcop study reproduce \
  --plan benchmark/studies/v0.6-evidence.yaml \
  --selection full \
  --source-artifact artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6 \
  --output artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6-evidence
tcop artifact verify artifacts/federated-domain-v0.6-evidence \
  --require-complete --require-replayable

The v0.6 agent-validation layer is also separate. It refuses to run if the formally admitted source artifacts or frozen strategy certificates differ, and it never rewrites those inputs. The credential-free path exercises the same signed-context, receipt-correlation, local-authorization, causal-barrier, and negative-control contracts without claiming external validity:

tcop study agent prepare
tcop study agent reproduce --selection smoke \
  --output artifacts/v0.6-agent-validation
tcop artifact verify artifacts/v0.6-agent-validation --require-replayable

The reference-gateway selection, generic local-authorization patch, and bounded five-service deployment are documented in integrations/mcp-gateway/ and deploy/agent-validation/. A provider-neutral LLM run requires an explicit runtime configuration and an environment-variable credential; its captured tool trace is replayed deterministically and is never used to alter the frozen TCOP protocol or prior artifacts.

The repository checkout supplies the frozen v0.5 validation inputs by default. An installed CLI used elsewhere must receive the equivalent immutable input root explicitly with --source /path/to/minimality-v0.5-validation.

Commands emit JSON by default and also accept --format text|json|jsonl. Commands that create a file or artifact reserve --output for that destination and retain --format for their structured stdout representation. Diagnostics and service logs go to stderr.

Safe local service

The checked-in domain configuration is a versioned local-service example. Inspect it before binding a listener:

tcop service domain --config config/domain-local.example.yaml --dry-run
tcop service domain --config config/domain-local.example.yaml
tcop admin health --endpoint http://127.0.0.1:8443

The listener accepts only context publication/receipt and observational endpoints. Received context is validated and resolved locally; it cannot quarantine a remote agent, disable a remote capability, or terminate a remote workflow. tcop admin is read-only.

Compatibility commands

The v0.1–v0.5 deterministic commands remain available through the CLI for reproduction compatibility (tcop benchmark, witness, reliability, confirmation, minimality, and federated). A Makefile remains only as a developer shortcut that delegates to tcop; it is not the public interface.

Safety and non-goals

All evaluated tools, target systems, and enforcement actions are synthetic. The default review workflow uses no provider credential. Optional credentialed trace generation is bounded, separately locked, and cannot replace the frozen replay evidence used for paper claims.

TCOP is not a production deployment, Internet-scale federation, global consensus system, or key-lifecycle service. This repository does not expose a cross-domain enforcement interface, attack real systems, or reverse completed actions. Docker is needed only for the optional reference-gateway smoke path; production enforcement, Kubernetes, Kafka, and external discovery remain out of scope.

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Trust Context Protocol: Receiver-Bound Runtime Evidence for Cross-Domain Agent Authorization

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