Matched advisory candidates (shard 2b)

advisories/BREW-aider-CVE-2025-43859.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema_version": "1.7.3",
   "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2025-43859",
   "published": "2026-08-13T16:35:12Z",
-  "modified": "2026-09-17T19:11:20Z",
+  "modified": "2026-10-27T19:19:30Z",
   "upstream": [
     "GHSA-vqfr-h8mv-ghfj",
     "CVE-2025-43859",
@@ -73,9 +73,17 @@
       "type": "WEB",
       "url": "https://github.com/python-hyper/h11/commit/114803a29ce50116dc47951c690ad4892b1a36ed"
     },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/h11/PYSEC-2026-348.yaml"
+    },
     {
       "type": "PACKAGE",
       "url": "https://github.com/python-hyper/h11"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/h11"
     }
   ]
 }

advisories/BREW-aider-CVE-2026-110855.json

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
+  "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-110855",
+  "published": "2026-10-27T19:19:30Z",
+  "modified": "2026-10-27T19:19:30Z",
+  "upstream": [
+    "GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
+    "CVE-2026-110855"
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
+        "name": "aider",
+        "purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0.47.1"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "ecosystem_specific": {
+        "fix": null,
+        "range_state": "affected",
+        "upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0",
+        "resource": "gitpython",
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "source": "matched",
+    "strategy": "registry",
+    "confidence": "high",
+    "upstream_evidence": [
+      {
+        "strategy": "registry",
+        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
+        "name": "gitpython",
+        "subject_version": "3.1.46",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
+        "resource": "gitpython"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
+  "details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`'s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`'s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n    kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` — this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`'s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory's own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/   (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=<value>` subprocess argument verbatim — `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/<name>` as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` → `.git/modules/<name>` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
+    }
+  ]
+}

advisories/BREW-aider-CVE-2026-110856.json

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
+  "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-110856",
+  "published": "2026-10-27T19:19:30Z",
+  "modified": "2026-10-27T19:19:30Z",
+  "upstream": [
+    "GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7",
+    "CVE-2026-110856"
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
+        "name": "aider",
+        "purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0.47.1"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "ecosystem_specific": {
+        "fix": null,
+        "range_state": "affected",
+        "upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0",
+        "resource": "gitpython",
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "source": "matched",
+    "strategy": "registry",
+    "confidence": "high",
+    "upstream_evidence": [
+      {
+        "strategy": "registry",
+        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
+        "name": "gitpython",
+        "subject_version": "3.1.46",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
+        "resource": "gitpython"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "summary": "GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines",
+  "details": "### Summary\n\nThis is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made `Actor._from_string` regex-free, but `parse_actor_and_date` still runs `_re_actor_epoch` on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.\n\n### Details\n\n`git/objects/util.py:322`:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n```\n\n`.+?` and `(.*)` can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required ` (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+)` tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.\n\nIt is called from `parse_actor_and_date` (`git/objects/util.py:335`), which runs on the author and committer lines in `Commit._deserialize` (`git/objects/commit.py:917`, `:931`) and on the tagger line in `git/objects/tag.py:129`.\n\nThe published payload (letters plus an unterminated `<`) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:\n\n| author line (after `author `) | 2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `'a'*n + ' <'` (advisory payload) | 0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms |\n| `' '*n` | 28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms |\n| valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms |\n\nCost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport time\nfrom git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date\n\nline = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000\nt = time.perf_counter()\nparse_actor_and_date(line)\nprint(f\"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s\")   # ~7 s on 3.1.62\n```\n\nEnd to end, reading `Commit.author` on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid `1191999972 -0700` tail takes 1.3 ms.\n\nNote for reproducing: `git hash-object -t commit -w` refuses such an object (`missingEmail`), so the test object was written with `--literally`. A remote can still serve one, because `fetch.fsckObjects` and `transfer.fsckObjects` default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 (\"craft a commit object with a malformed author field\").\n\n### Impact\n\nCPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to `Commit.author`, `Commit.committer` or `TagObject.tagger` on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nMatch the leading field name with `.[^ ]*` instead of `.+?`. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but `.[^ ]*` cannot overlap the following `(.*)`, so the backtracking disappears:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n```\n\nVerification on current main (73a72c9):\n\n- Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.\n- `' '*n` at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).\n- The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change\n- The new regression test, `test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear`, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).\n\nThe full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py\nindex a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644\n--- a/git/objects/util.py\n+++ b/git/objects/util.py\n@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]:\n \n \n # Precompiled regexes\n-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*)$\")\n+# The leading field name (\"author\", \"committer\", \"tagger\") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than\n+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the\n+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.\n+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n \n \n def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]:\ndiff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py\nindex cf4299d5..e1631420 100644\n--- a/test/test_util.py\n+++ b/test/test_util.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify\n from git.objects.util import (\n     altz_to_utctz_str,\n     from_timestamp,\n+    parse_actor_and_date,\n     parse_date,\n     tzoffset,\n     utctz_to_altz,\n@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):\n             Actor(\"name last another\", \"some-very-long-email@example.com\"),\n         )\n \n+    def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):\n+        # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make\n+        # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.\n+        # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.\n+        for tail in (\"\", \" notanumber -0700\", \" 1191999972\", \" -0700\", \" 1191999972 xx\"):\n+            line = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000 + tail\n+            start = time.perf_counter()\n+            actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)\n+            self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)\n+            self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)\n+            self.assertEqual(offset, 0)\n+\n+        # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\n+            \"author Tom Preston-Werner <tom@mojombo.com> 1191999972 -0700\"\n+        )\n+        self.assertEqual(actor, Actor(\"Tom Preston-Werner\", \"tom@mojombo.com\"))\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)\n+        self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)\n+\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\"author \" + \"a \" * 16000 + \"<a@b> 1 -0700\")\n+        self.assertEqual(actor.email, \"a@b\")\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)\n+\n     @ddt.data(\n         (\"name\", \"\"),\n         (\"name\", \"prefix_\"),\n```\n\nFound with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.\n\nBrian Willows",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V4",
+      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2253"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8290c98d35465a38090cdcc1b17be69967092a15"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
+    }
+  ]
+}