security: pin GitHub Actions references to commit SHAs#3
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Pin all uses: references to 40-char commit SHAs to harden against supply-chain attacks via tag/branch rotation.
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Summary
Pins all GitHub Actions references in this repo to 40-character commit SHAs, replacing tag and branch references. This is a supply-chain hardening change with no expected functional impact — every SHA was resolved from its current tag/branch at audit time (2026-05-27).
Why
Tag-pinned actions can be silently compromised if the upstream tag is rotated to a malicious commit. Branch-pinned actions (e.g.
@main,@release/v1,@stable) are even riskier — anyone with push access upstream can change what runs in CI.GitHub's own recommendation: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions
Notes
@main,@release/v1,@stable) were resolved to the branch HEAD at audit time — re-verify before merge if the upstream branch has moved since.