capabilities.json

{
  "_comment": "Single source of truth for VAID capability STATUS. Prose (the marketing site, docs) renders status FROM this file rather than asserting it, so a sentence can never carry a stale status. Guarded by TWO CI checks: (1) a DRIFT check — every vendored copy (e.g. the site's) must byte-match this file; (2) a VERIFICATION check (scripts/verify-capabilities.mjs) — status must match reality: a `shipped` capability's package version must be published on its registry (or its repo_ref must resolve), and a `roadmap`/`planned` capability blocked on a PR must have that PR still OPEN (a capability blocked on a merged PR is a status that should have flipped). See docs/adr/0002-capabilities-manifest.md. NOTE: `status_text` is the one hand-written field — a review item at release, not generated.",
  "version": 1,
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "id": "request-pop-verification",
      "title": "Request proof-of-possession verification",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-pop 0.1.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.2.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.1.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A request's proof-of-possession is verifiable by any holder of the signer's public key — offline, no service. All three implementations ship the conformance firewall as an installable executable (`vaid-pop-conformance`); Rust gained one at 0.2.0, closing the gap where its only check ran from a repository checkout. A consumer therefore reproduces the frozen digest and signature from the artifact they received, in any of the three.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "reference-mint",
      "title": "Reference mint (issuance, delegation, attenuation)",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.1.2",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.1.2"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.1.3"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A reference mint issues VAIDs and mints attenuated child VAIDs; published and installable. Rust and Python version independently — Python 0.1.3 is a docs-only PyPI re-release over the same 0.1.2 behaviour — so byte-for-byte agreement is asserted at the conformance-vector level, not the version number.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "cross-language-conformance",
      "title": "Cross-language conformance",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-pop 0.1.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.1.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.1.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "Rust and Python reproduce a frozen conformance vector byte-for-byte.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "langchain-adapter",
      "title": "LangChain request-signing adapter",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-langchain 0.1.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-langchain",
          "version": "0.1.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A LangChain adapter that signs requests under the VAID proof-of-possession contract.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "vaid-document-verification",
      "title": "Public-key VAID document verification",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.2.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.2.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.2.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "Verifying a VAID document's authenticity from the issuer's public key alone — no issuer instance.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "revocation-lineage-aware",
      "title": "Three-state, lineage-aware revocation seam",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.2.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.2.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.2.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "Revocation checked over a VAID's full lineage — three-state, revoking a parent revokes its children, and a status that cannot be determined (Unavailable) fails closed. THE DEFAULT IS FAIL-CLOSED FROM vaid-mint 0.9.0, published on crates.io, PyPI and npm. Every vaid-mint published before 0.9.0 constructs the issuer with an assume-nothing-revoked in-memory store, which vouches NotRevoked for every VAID it was never told about and cannot detect its own restart — a fail-open posture reached by assumption, so a VAID revoked before a restart verifies clean. See GHSA-p336-fc9m-vcq4. On an affected version an integrator gets fail-closed behaviour only by holding the store absent or injecting a durable RevocationCheck. See revocation-fail-closed-default.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "revocation-fail-closed-default",
      "title": "Fail-closed revocation by default",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.9.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.9.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.9.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.9.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "ReferenceIssuer's revocation store starts ABSENT, so verification fails closed until revocation state is loaded (spec R.4.5), and durable revocation becomes two stores (R.4.6: revoked set AND lineage). Breaking in all three languages. Released as vaid-mint 0.9.0 on crates.io, PyPI and npm. Each leg was verified from a clean install against the packaged conformance firewall, and all three reproduce the same frozen mint_v1 digest. Security advisory for the fail-open default this replaces: GHSA-p336-fc9m-vcq4.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "typescript-implementation",
      "title": "TypeScript implementation (third conforming language)",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-pop / vaid-mint / vaid-client 0.3.0 (npm)",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-pop",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-client",
          "version": "0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A third conforming implementation in TypeScript — minting with attenuation, public-key VAID verification, request proof-of-possession, and the three-state revocation seam. It reproduces all five frozen conformance vectors byte-for-byte in CI alongside Rust and Python. Published on npm (vaid-pop, vaid-mint, vaid-client), landing at 0.3.0 — the version this capability LANDED IN, not an install instruction: the three packages version independently and have moved since. What you get installing today is registry-checked separately and must never be sourced from this file. Each ships a packaged conformance firewall — `npx -p vaid-mint vaid-mint-conformance` and the two siblings — which reproduces the frozen digests from the INSTALLED package, so a consumer can check the artifact they actually received rather than trusting this claim.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "attenuation-verification",
      "title": "Third-party attenuation (authority) verification",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.4.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A third party holding the issuer's kernel PUBLIC key and the ancestor documents a presenter supplies can verify that a child's authority is within its parent's, at every hop — scope, capabilities, expiry, and the qualified (trust_domain, tenant_id) pair. A child's expiry is contained by its parent's, and a chain with a lapsed ancestor is refused rather than reported attenuated. Containment reuses the mint-time matchers, so verify-time cannot drift from the check that gated issuance. Achieved by detached chain presentation (ADR-0003) with NO change to the VAID document: no new field, no sig_version bump, no mint_v1 re-freeze. That last sentence is a statement about ADR-0003 and about nothing else: it describes what THAT change cost, not the current state of the wire format. ADR-0009 later typed scope_boundary's entries, which did move sig_version to 4 and did re-freeze mint_v1 — containment reuses the same matchers over the typed entries, so the capability described here is unchanged by it. Pinned cross-language by chain_v1.json. LIMITS, stated because they are load-bearing: the presenter must retain and present the ancestors, so a leaf whose ancestor documents were discarded has unverifiable attenuation; and full-chain verification requires full-chain disclosure.",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "lineage-chain-verification",
      "title": "Third-party end-to-end lineage verification",
      "status": "shipped",
      "landed_in": "vaid-mint 0.4.0",
      "packages": [
        {
          "language": "rust",
          "registry": "crates.io",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "python",
          "registry": "pypi",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        },
        {
          "language": "typescript",
          "registry": "npm",
          "package": "vaid-mint",
          "version": "0.4.0"
        }
      ],
      "status_text": "A third party can walk a full delegation chain from a presented bundle: every document authenticated, every hop pinned against the signed parent_vaid, and any gap — an unpresented ancestor, a cycle, an implausible depth — failing closed as attenuation-unverifiable rather than attenuation-satisfied. Chains that cross kernel keys additionally require a detached consent attestation from the issuer that minted the parent (attestation_v1.json), because nothing in a VAID document otherwise proves the parent consented; a cross-key hop without valid consent never verifies. LIMITS: revocation is NOT consulted by chain verification anywhere on the chain, and the leaf's OWN expiry is not consulted either — expiry is enforced BETWEEN hops, so a lapsed ancestor is refused, but the presented leaf must still be checked by the caller (vaid#76); and consent is time-bounded rather than revocable — retraction inside an attestation's window needs durable revocation, which this implementation does not provide (docs/spec/revocation.md R.4.6, docs/spec/consent-attestation.md C.6).",
      "blocked_on": null
    },
    {
      "id": "cross-deployment-verification",
      "title": "Cross-deployment VAID verification",
      "status": "planned",
      "landed_in": null,
      "packages": [],
      "status_text": "Verifying a VAID issued by one deployment from another. v3 (ADR-0004) supplies the missing identifier — the document names its issuing trust domain and commits to the key that signed it — and the publication route exists: the SYNTHERA substrate's kernel public key is published, with its RFC 7638 thumbprint in three independent channels, so a third party can obtain the key and confirm it is the right one (see /trust-anchor). The substrate emits both v3 identity fields today: the revision serving 100% of substrate traffic is built from synthera 8556828, whose crates/synthera-types/src/vaid.rs sets sig_version 3, trust_domain and kernel_key_thumbprint on every document it constructs; and a production VAID captured on 2026-08-07 (synthera docs/evidence/vaid-third-party-verification-2026-08-07/production-vaid.json) verifies VALID under published vaid-mint 0.7.0 against the published anchor key, by the open standard's own verifier, with no substrate cooperation. Authenticity across deployments therefore works today (verified 2026-09-21). What remains is not a deploy: (1) the substrate's trust_domain is 'substrate.internal', reserved by RFC 6761, and docs/trust-anchor.md says a conforming verifier SHOULD refuse to bind a trust bundle to a special-use name — so key selection works by thumbprint while domain binding does not exist, pending an issuer-naming decision that is irreversible once verifiers bind to it; and (2) per synthera ADR-0034 the substrate's document carries an additional external_identity member, so it is a superset of the standard's document rather than the same document — it verifies only because ADR-0006 canonicalizes over presented bytes, and a verifier that re-projects into its own struct would reject it.",
      "blocked_on": {
        "type": "decision",
        "ref": "an issuer-naming decision: the substrate's trust_domain is the RFC 6761 special-use name 'substrate.internal', so no trust bundle can be bound to it. Substrate adoption of the v3 identity fields (synthera ADR-0034) is DONE and serving; the kernel public key publication route (synthera#16) is CLEARED, published 2026-08-03"
      }
    }
  ]
}