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THREAT-MODEL.md

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Threat model

Protected assets

The runtime protects page availability, bounded memory/decoder/GPU ownership, graph determinism, source-generation isolation, and the confidentiality of credentials and local environment details. Release tooling additionally protects tarball identity, report provenance, registry tags, and rollback records.

Trust boundaries

  • .avl headers, manifests, indexes, AVC, PNG, and offsets are hostile bytes.
  • HTTP status, range metadata, validators, encodings, redirects, chunks, and body length are hostile until their exact contract and digest pass.
  • Element attributes, authored identifiers, DOM events, observers, and public callbacks can be re-entrant.
  • Workers, decoders, canvases, WebGL contexts, and browser callbacks can fail, arrive late, or outlive a replaced source unless generation ownership stops them.
  • Reports and attachments are hostile until schema, bounds, path, length, and digest verification completes.
  • Registry state must be read before any publish/tag mutation.

Explicit non-goals

This project does not provide DRM, secret media, remote code execution inside assets, a runtime kill switch, patent clearance, or physical display evidence from browser callback timestamps. Codec and source-media rights remain the publisher's responsibility.