diff --git a/.difyignore b/.difyignore
index 359985c..5cd3508 100644
--- a/.difyignore
+++ b/.difyignore
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ __pycache__/
 .venv
 env/
 venv/
+.git
 .git/
 .gitignore
 .DS_Store
+.venv-test/
+tests/
+.github/
+.pytest_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.claude/
+requirements-dev.txt
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index cf2b8a3..da4f5bd 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -6,7 +6,17 @@ Format: [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/). Versions follo
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.0.3] - 2026-05-30
+
 ### Added
+- `sign_action` now returns a structured `authorized` decision. On a permitted
+  action it returns `authorized=true` with the signature receipt, now including
+  `signature_b64`. On a policy block, emergency halt, delegation limit, or
+  agent quarantine it returns `authorized=false` with a machine `reason`
+  (`policy_blocked`, `emergency_halt`, `delegation_denied`, `quarantine`, or
+  `denied`) and a human-readable `detail`, so a workflow can branch on the
+  decision instead of failing. A policy block also passes through the signed
+  denial receipt (`signed_deny`), which is itself verifiable.
 - pytest smoke suite covering the provider entrypoint and all three tools, with
   network calls mocked so the suite runs offline.
 - GitHub Actions CI (`.github/workflows/ci.yml`) running pytest on Python 3.12
@@ -14,6 +24,26 @@ Format: [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/). Versions follo
   push to `main`.
 - `requirements-dev.txt` listing the test dependencies, plus a Development
   section in the README explaining how to run the suite locally.
+- `output_schema` declarations on all three tools (`sign_action`,
+  `verify_signature`, `request_action`) so downstream workflow nodes can
+  address each returned field by name.
+
+### Changed
+- Plugin user-facing text is now English-only (`en_US`). Removed the
+  untranslated `zh_Hans` and `pt_BR` locale keys that duplicated the English
+  strings across the manifest, provider, and tool definitions.
+- README now documents the full output of each tool, including the structured
+  `authorized` decision and `signature_b64` from `sign_action`.
+
+### Fixed
+- Each tool now emits its result as individual workflow variables in addition
+  to the JSON message, so a Dify workflow node can address each field by name
+  (`signature_id`, `authorized`, `verified`, and so on) at runtime. A JSON
+  message alone left named selectors unresolved once wired in a workflow.
+- The `sign_action` `timestamp` output is a Unix epoch number, not an ISO 8601
+  string; corrected its type and description in the tool schema.
+- Capitalised the display label and credential prose to "Asqav" across the
+  manifest, provider, and tool definitions.
 
 ## [0.0.2] - 2026-05-11
 
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index d6d16c4..76f319e 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -27,13 +27,18 @@ The plugin inherits the SDK's `mode` behavior whenever it is invoked through the
 ## Tools
 
 ### Sign Action
-Signs an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Provide an action type (e.g. "read:data", "tool:execute") and optional context. Returns a signature ID and public verification URL.
+Signs an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Provide an action type (e.g. "read:data", "tool:execute") and optional context JSON.
+
+Returns a JSON object with an `authorized` boolean so a workflow can branch on the decision instead of failing:
+
+- When the action is permitted, `authorized` is `true` and the result includes `signature_id`, `action_id`, `timestamp`, `verification_url`, and the base64 ML-DSA-65 signature in `signature_b64`.
+- When the action is blocked, `authorized` is `false` and the result includes a machine `reason` (`policy_blocked`, `emergency_halt`, `delegation_denied`, `quarantine`, or `denied`) plus a human-readable `detail`. A policy block also returns `attestation_hash` and a `signed_deny` envelope, which is itself a verifiable signed denial receipt.
 
 ### Verify Signature
-Verifies a signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint - no authentication needed. Returns the verification status, signing agent, action details, and timestamp.
+Verifies a signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint - no authentication needed. Returns `verified`, the signing `agent_id` and `agent_name`, the `action_type`, the `algorithm` (e.g. ML-DSA-65), the `signed_at` timestamp, and the `verification_url`.
 
 ### Request Action
-Creates a multi-party signing session for high-risk actions. The action must be approved by enough signing entities before it is authorized. Use this as a pre-execution gate in workflows.
+Creates a multi-party signing session for high-risk actions. The action must be approved by enough signing entities before it is authorized. Use this as a pre-execution gate in workflows. Returns the `session_id`, `status`, `approvals_required`, `signatures_collected`, `action_type`, `created_at`, and `expires_at`.
 
 ## Setup
 
diff --git a/manifest.yaml b/manifest.yaml
index 5ad0540..a3bf475 100644
--- a/manifest.yaml
+++ b/manifest.yaml
@@ -1,15 +1,11 @@
-version: 0.0.2
+version: 0.0.3
 type: plugin
 author: asqav
 name: asqav
 label:
-  en_US: asqav
-  zh_Hans: asqav
-  pt_BR: asqav
+  en_US: Asqav
 description:
   en_US: AI agent governance via asqav.com. Audit trails, policy enforcement, and compliance. Sign agent actions, verify signatures, and request multi-party authorized actions.
-  zh_Hans: AI agent governance via asqav.com. Audit trails, policy enforcement, and compliance. Sign agent actions, verify signatures, and request multi-party authorized actions.
-  pt_BR: AI agent governance via asqav.com. Audit trails, policy enforcement, and compliance. Sign agent actions, verify signatures, and request multi-party authorized actions.
 icon: icon.svg
 resource:
   memory: 268435456
@@ -23,7 +19,7 @@ plugins:
   tools:
     - provider/asqav.yaml
 meta:
-  version: 0.0.2
+  version: 0.0.3
   arch:
     - amd64
     - arm64
diff --git a/provider/asqav.yaml b/provider/asqav.yaml
index 0ac24da..e918fc5 100644
--- a/provider/asqav.yaml
+++ b/provider/asqav.yaml
@@ -2,13 +2,9 @@ identity:
   author: asqav
   name: asqav
   label:
-    en_US: asqav
-    zh_Hans: asqav
-    pt_BR: asqav
+    en_US: Asqav
   description:
     en_US: AI agent governance, audit trails, and compliance. Sign agent actions with ML-DSA-65 via asqav.com.
-    zh_Hans: AI agent governance, audit trails, and compliance. Sign agent actions with ML-DSA-65 via asqav.com.
-    pt_BR: AI agent governance, audit trails, and compliance. Sign agent actions with ML-DSA-65 via asqav.com.
   icon: icon.svg
   tags:
     - utilities
@@ -17,33 +13,21 @@ credentials_for_provider:
     type: secret-input
     required: true
     label:
-      en_US: asqav API Key
-      zh_Hans: asqav API Key
-      pt_BR: asqav API Key
+      en_US: Asqav API Key
     placeholder:
-      en_US: Enter your asqav API key (sk_...)
-      zh_Hans: Enter your asqav API key (sk_...)
-      pt_BR: Enter your asqav API key (sk_...)
+      en_US: Enter your Asqav API key (sk_...)
     help:
       en_US: Get your API key at asqav.com
-      zh_Hans: Get your API key at asqav.com
-      pt_BR: Get your API key at asqav.com
     url: https://asqav.com
   asqav_agent_id:
     type: text-input
     required: true
     label:
       en_US: Agent ID
-      zh_Hans: Agent ID
-      pt_BR: Agent ID
     placeholder:
-      en_US: Your asqav agent ID (agent_...)
-      zh_Hans: Your asqav agent ID (agent_...)
-      pt_BR: Your asqav agent ID (agent_...)
+      en_US: Your Asqav agent ID (agent_...)
     help:
       en_US: The agent ID to use for signing actions
-      zh_Hans: The agent ID to use for signing actions
-      pt_BR: The agent ID to use for signing actions
 tools:
   - tools/sign_action.yaml
   - tools/verify_signature.yaml
diff --git a/tests/test_tools_smoke.py b/tests/test_tools_smoke.py
index 0a02780..5e6c806 100644
--- a/tests/test_tools_smoke.py
+++ b/tests/test_tools_smoke.py
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 from dify_plugin.entities.tool import ToolInvokeMessage, ToolRuntime
 
 from tools.request_action import RequestActionTool
-from tools.sign_action import SignActionTool
+from tools.sign_action import SignActionTool, _denied_result
 from tools.verify_signature import VerifySignatureTool
 
 
@@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ def _make_tool(tool_cls, credentials: dict[str, Any]):
     return tool
 
 
+def _json_and_var_names(messages):
+    """Split tool output into its single JSON message and the variable names emitted."""
+    json_msgs = [m for m in messages if m.type == ToolInvokeMessage.MessageType.JSON]
+    var_names = {
+        m.message.variable_name
+        for m in messages
+        if m.type == ToolInvokeMessage.MessageType.VARIABLE
+    }
+    return json_msgs, var_names
+
+
 @pytest.fixture
 def credentials() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {
@@ -77,7 +88,9 @@ def test_sign_action_posts_expected_body(
     assert kwargs["json"]["action_type"] == "tool:execute"
     assert kwargs["json"]["context"] == {"foo": "bar"}
 
-    assert len(messages) == 1
+    json_msgs, var_names = _json_and_var_names(messages)
+    assert len(json_msgs) == 1
+    assert {"authorized", "signature_id", "verification_url"} <= var_names
 
 
 def test_sign_action_treats_invalid_json_context_as_raw(
@@ -132,7 +145,9 @@ def test_verify_signature_calls_public_endpoint(
     fake_get.assert_called_once()
     args, _ = fake_get.call_args
     assert args[0].endswith("/verify/sig_123")
-    assert len(messages) == 1
+    json_msgs, var_names = _json_and_var_names(messages)
+    assert len(json_msgs) == 1
+    assert {"verified", "signature_id", "algorithm"} <= var_names
 
 
 def test_request_action_builds_signing_session_body(
@@ -167,4 +182,65 @@ def test_request_action_builds_signing_session_body(
     assert kwargs["json"]["agent_id"] == credentials["asqav_agent_id"]
     assert kwargs["json"]["action_type"] == "transfer:funds"
     assert kwargs["json"]["params"] == {"amount": 100}
-    assert len(messages) == 1
+    json_msgs, var_names = _json_and_var_names(messages)
+    assert len(json_msgs) == 1
+    assert {"session_id", "status", "approvals_required"} <= var_names
+
+
+def test_sign_action_surfaces_403_without_raising(
+    mocker, credentials: dict[str, Any], fake_response_factory
+) -> None:
+    """A 403 policy decision is yielded as one structured message, never raised."""
+    mocker.patch(
+        "tools.sign_action.httpx.post",
+        return_value=fake_response_factory(
+            status_code=403,
+            json_data={
+                "detail": "Organization is under emergency halt; signing is disabled"
+            },
+        ),
+    )
+
+    tool = _make_tool(SignActionTool, credentials)
+    messages = list(tool._invoke({"action_type": "refund:approve", "context": ""}))
+
+    json_msgs, var_names = _json_and_var_names(messages)
+    assert len(json_msgs) == 1
+    assert {"authorized", "reason"} <= var_names
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("detail", "expected_reason"),
+    [
+        ("Organization is under emergency halt; signing is disabled", "emergency_halt"),
+        ("Action type is outside the agent's delegated scope", "delegation_denied"),
+        ("Agent's delegation has expired", "delegation_denied"),
+        ("Agent is in quarantine mode (read/verify only, signing disabled)", "quarantine"),
+        ("Some unmapped refusal text", "denied"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_denied_result_maps_string_details(
+    detail: str, expected_reason: str, fake_response_factory
+) -> None:
+    """String-form 403 details map to a stable machine reason."""
+    result = _denied_result(fake_response_factory(status_code=403, json_data={"detail": detail}))
+
+    assert result["authorized"] is False
+    assert result["reason"] == expected_reason
+    assert result["detail"] == detail
+    assert result["signed_deny"] is None
+
+
+def test_denied_result_passes_through_signed_deny_envelope(fake_response_factory) -> None:
+    """A policy/content block returns policy_blocked with its signed denial receipt."""
+    detail = {
+        "error": "action_denied",
+        "attestation_hash": "abc123",
+        "signed_deny": {"body": {}, "signature_b64": "ZmFrZQ==", "algorithm": "ML-DSA-65"},
+    }
+    result = _denied_result(fake_response_factory(status_code=403, json_data={"detail": detail}))
+
+    assert result["authorized"] is False
+    assert result["reason"] == "policy_blocked"
+    assert result["attestation_hash"] == "abc123"
+    assert result["signed_deny"]["signature_b64"] == "ZmFrZQ=="
diff --git a/tools/_outputs.py b/tools/_outputs.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7b8803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/_outputs.py
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+from collections.abc import Generator
+from typing import Any
+
+from dify_plugin import Tool
+from dify_plugin.entities.tool import ToolInvokeMessage
+
+
+def emit(tool: Tool, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> Generator[ToolInvokeMessage]:
+    """Emit a result as one JSON message plus one variable message per field.
+
+    A Dify workflow node can address a tool's individual outputs by name
+    (``{{#node.field#}}``) only when the tool emits variable messages; a JSON
+    message alone surfaces under the single ``json`` output and leaves named
+    selectors unresolved at runtime. Emitting both keeps the ``json`` blob and
+    makes every field resolvable as ``[node, key]``.
+    """
+    yield tool.create_json_message(payload)
+    for key, value in payload.items():
+        yield tool.create_variable_message(key, value)
diff --git a/tools/request_action.py b/tools/request_action.py
index c00fbf1..3b15bbb 100644
--- a/tools/request_action.py
+++ b/tools/request_action.py
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 from dify_plugin import Tool
 from dify_plugin.entities.tool import ToolInvokeMessage
 
+from tools._outputs import emit
+
 API_BASE = "https://api.asqav.com/api/v1"
 
 
@@ -36,7 +38,7 @@ def _invoke(self, tool_parameters: dict[str, Any]) -> Generator[ToolInvokeMessag
         response.raise_for_status()
         data = response.json()
 
-        yield self.create_json_message({
+        yield from emit(self, {
             "session_id": data["session_id"],
             "status": data["status"],
             "approvals_required": data["approvals_required"],
diff --git a/tools/request_action.yaml b/tools/request_action.yaml
index 65671e7..c080911 100644
--- a/tools/request_action.yaml
+++ b/tools/request_action.yaml
@@ -3,13 +3,9 @@ identity:
   author: asqav
   label:
     en_US: Request Action
-    zh_Hans: Request Action
-    pt_BR: Request Action
 description:
   human:
     en_US: Request a multi-party authorized action. Creates a signing session that requires entity approvals before the action is authorized. Use this as a pre-execution gate for high-risk actions.
-    zh_Hans: Request a multi-party authorized action. Creates a signing session that requires entity approvals before the action is authorized. Use this as a pre-execution gate for high-risk actions.
-    pt_BR: Request a multi-party authorized action. Creates a signing session that requires entity approvals before the action is authorized. Use this as a pre-execution gate for high-risk actions.
   llm: Request a multi-party authorized action for an agent. Creates a signing session that requires multiple entity approvals. Returns the session ID, status, required approvals count, and current signatures collected. Use this as a gate before executing high-risk actions.
 parameters:
   - name: action_type
@@ -17,12 +13,8 @@ parameters:
     required: true
     label:
       en_US: Action Type
-      zh_Hans: Action Type
-      pt_BR: Action Type
     human_description:
       en_US: Type of action requiring authorization, e.g. "deploy:production"
-      zh_Hans: Type of action requiring authorization, e.g. "deploy:production"
-      pt_BR: Type of action requiring authorization, e.g. "deploy:production"
     llm_description: The action type that needs multi-party authorization. Examples - "deploy:production", "delete:resource", "transfer:funds".
     form: llm
   - name: params
@@ -30,14 +22,34 @@ parameters:
     required: false
     label:
       en_US: Parameters (JSON)
-      zh_Hans: Parameters (JSON)
-      pt_BR: Parameters (JSON)
     human_description:
       en_US: Optional JSON string with parameters for the action
-      zh_Hans: Optional JSON string with parameters for the action
-      pt_BR: Optional JSON string with parameters for the action
     llm_description: Optional JSON string with parameters for the action. Example - {"target":"us-east-1","version":"2.0"}
     form: llm
 extra:
   python:
     source: tools/request_action.py
+output_schema:
+  type: object
+  properties:
+    session_id:
+      type: string
+      description: ID of the multi-party signing session.
+    status:
+      type: string
+      description: Current session status, e.g. pending, approved, or expired.
+    approvals_required:
+      type: number
+      description: Number of entity approvals required before authorization.
+    signatures_collected:
+      type: number
+      description: Number of approvals collected so far.
+    action_type:
+      type: string
+      description: The action type requiring authorization.
+    created_at:
+      type: string
+      description: ISO 8601 timestamp when the session was created.
+    expires_at:
+      type: string
+      description: ISO 8601 timestamp when the session expires.
diff --git a/tools/sign_action.py b/tools/sign_action.py
index cadc473..2cbf8d5 100644
--- a/tools/sign_action.py
+++ b/tools/sign_action.py
@@ -7,8 +7,18 @@
 from dify_plugin import Tool
 from dify_plugin.entities.tool import ToolInvokeMessage
 
+from tools._outputs import emit
+
 API_BASE = "https://api.asqav.com/api/v1"
 
+#: Substring of a string-form 403 detail -> stable machine reason (halt/delegation/quarantine).
+_STRING_REASONS: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
+    ("emergency halt", "emergency_halt"),
+    ("delegated scope", "delegation_denied"),
+    ("delegation has expired", "delegation_denied"),
+    ("quarantine", "quarantine"),
+)
+
 
 class SignActionTool(Tool):
     def _invoke(self, tool_parameters: dict[str, Any]) -> Generator[ToolInvokeMessage]:
@@ -33,12 +43,61 @@ def _invoke(self, tool_parameters: dict[str, Any]) -> Generator[ToolInvokeMessag
             },
             timeout=30.0,
         )
+
+        # A 403 is a policy decision the workflow can branch on; other non-2xx stays loud below.
+        if response.status_code == 403:
+            yield from emit(self, _denied_result(response))
+            return
+
         response.raise_for_status()
         data = response.json()
 
-        yield self.create_json_message({
+        yield from emit(self, {
+            "authorized": True,
             "signature_id": data["signature_id"],
             "action_id": data["action_id"],
             "timestamp": data["timestamp"],
             "verification_url": data["verification_url"],
+            "signature_b64": data.get("signature_b64"),
         })
+
+
+def _denied_result(response: httpx.Response) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Normalize a 403 refusal into a branchable ``authorized=false`` result.
+
+    The Asqav cloud returns two ``detail`` shapes for a refused sign: a dict
+    ``{"error", "attestation_hash", "signed_deny"}`` for a policy or content
+    block, or a plain string for emergency halt, delegation, and quarantine
+    refusals. A policy block carries a signed denial receipt (``signed_deny``)
+    that is itself verifiable. Both shapes map to ``authorized=false``; the
+    caller never sees this when a signature was actually minted.
+    """
+    try:
+        detail: Any = response.json().get("detail")
+    except (ValueError, KeyError, AttributeError):
+        detail = None
+
+    if isinstance(detail, dict):
+        is_policy = detail.get("error") == "action_denied"
+        return {
+            "authorized": False,
+            "reason": "policy_blocked" if is_policy else "denied",
+            "detail": detail.get("error", "action_denied"),
+            "attestation_hash": detail.get("attestation_hash"),
+            "signed_deny": detail.get("signed_deny"),
+        }
+
+    text = detail if isinstance(detail, str) and detail else "Action denied by policy"
+    reason = "denied"
+    lowered = text.lower()
+    for needle, mapped in _STRING_REASONS:
+        if needle in lowered:
+            reason = mapped
+            break
+    return {
+        "authorized": False,
+        "reason": reason,
+        "detail": text,
+        "attestation_hash": None,
+        "signed_deny": None,
+    }
diff --git a/tools/sign_action.yaml b/tools/sign_action.yaml
index 25e978c..6a480b5 100644
--- a/tools/sign_action.yaml
+++ b/tools/sign_action.yaml
@@ -3,26 +3,18 @@ identity:
   author: asqav
   label:
     en_US: Sign Action
-    zh_Hans: Sign Action
-    pt_BR: Sign Action
 description:
   human:
-    en_US: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Creates a tamper-evident audit record via asqav.com for AI agent governance and compliance. Returns the signature ID and verification URL.
-    zh_Hans: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Creates a tamper-evident audit record via asqav.com for AI agent governance and compliance. Returns the signature ID and verification URL.
-    pt_BR: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Creates a tamper-evident audit record via asqav.com for AI agent governance and compliance. Returns the signature ID and verification URL.
-  llm: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65 for AI agent governance and compliance. Provide an action_type string (e.g. "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute") and optional context as a JSON string. Returns the signature ID, action ID, timestamp, and a public verification URL.
+    en_US: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65. Creates a tamper-evident audit record via asqav.com for AI agent governance and compliance. Returns authorized=true with the signature ID and verification URL when the action is permitted, or authorized=false with a reason when a policy, an emergency halt, or a delegation limit blocks it.
+  llm: Sign an agent action with ML-DSA-65 for AI agent governance and compliance. Provide an action_type string (e.g. "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute") and optional context as a JSON string. Returns a JSON object with an "authorized" boolean. When true, it includes signature_id, action_id, timestamp, verification_url, and signature_b64. When false, it includes a "reason" (policy_blocked, emergency_halt, delegation_denied, quarantine, or denied) and a human-readable "detail" so the workflow can branch instead of failing.
 parameters:
   - name: action_type
     type: string
     required: true
     label:
       en_US: Action Type
-      zh_Hans: Action Type
-      pt_BR: Action Type
     human_description:
       en_US: Type of action being signed, e.g. "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute"
-      zh_Hans: Type of action being signed, e.g. "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute"
-      pt_BR: Type of action being signed, e.g. "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute"
     llm_description: The action type string that identifies the kind of action being signed. Examples - "read:data", "api:call", "tool:execute", "deploy:production".
     form: llm
   - name: context
@@ -30,14 +22,43 @@ parameters:
     required: false
     label:
       en_US: Context (JSON)
-      zh_Hans: Context (JSON)
-      pt_BR: Context (JSON)
     human_description:
       en_US: Optional JSON string with additional context for the action
-      zh_Hans: Optional JSON string with additional context for the action
-      pt_BR: Optional JSON string with additional context for the action
     llm_description: Optional JSON string with metadata about the action. Example - {"file":"config.json","user":"admin"}
     form: llm
 extra:
   python:
     source: tools/sign_action.py
+output_schema:
+  type: object
+  properties:
+    authorized:
+      type: boolean
+      description: True if the action was signed and permitted, false if blocked by policy, halt, delegation, or quarantine.
+    reason:
+      type: string
+      description: Machine reason when authorized is false - policy_blocked, emergency_halt, delegation_denied, quarantine, or denied. Absent when authorized.
+    detail:
+      type: string
+      description: Human-readable explanation of a denial.
+    attestation_hash:
+      type: string
+      description: Hash of the attestation for a content or policy block. Null otherwise.
+    signed_deny:
+      type: object
+      description: Verifiable signed denial for a policy block. Null otherwise.
+    signature_id:
+      type: string
+      description: The signature ID when authorized. Starts with sig_.
+    action_id:
+      type: string
+      description: The signed action ID when authorized.
+    timestamp:
+      type: number
+      description: Unix epoch timestamp (seconds) of the signature.
+    verification_url:
+      type: string
+      description: Public URL to verify the signature.
+    signature_b64:
+      type: string
+      description: Base64-encoded ML-DSA-65 signature.
diff --git a/tools/verify_signature.py b/tools/verify_signature.py
index 3932d4b..8d02c2f 100644
--- a/tools/verify_signature.py
+++ b/tools/verify_signature.py
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 from dify_plugin import Tool
 from dify_plugin.entities.tool import ToolInvokeMessage
 
+from tools._outputs import emit
+
 API_BASE = "https://api.asqav.com/api/v1"
 
 
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ def _invoke(self, tool_parameters: dict[str, Any]) -> Generator[ToolInvokeMessag
         response.raise_for_status()
         data = response.json()
 
-        yield self.create_json_message({
+        yield from emit(self, {
             "verified": data["verified"],
             "signature_id": data["signature_id"],
             "agent_id": data["agent_id"],
diff --git a/tools/verify_signature.yaml b/tools/verify_signature.yaml
index 1dbe99d..ed634bc 100644
--- a/tools/verify_signature.yaml
+++ b/tools/verify_signature.yaml
@@ -3,28 +3,47 @@ identity:
   author: asqav
   label:
     en_US: Verify Signature
-    zh_Hans: Verify Signature
-    pt_BR: Verify Signature
 description:
   human:
-    en_US: Verify an asqav signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint that requires no authentication. Returns whether the signature is valid, the agent that created it, and the action details.
-    zh_Hans: Verify an asqav signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint that requires no authentication. Returns whether the signature is valid, the agent that created it, and the action details.
-    pt_BR: Verify an asqav signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint that requires no authentication. Returns whether the signature is valid, the agent that created it, and the action details.
-  llm: Verify an asqav signature by its signature ID. Returns verification status, the signing agent name/ID, the action type, and the timestamp. No authentication needed.
+    en_US: Verify an Asqav signature by its ID. This is a public endpoint that requires no authentication. Returns whether the signature is valid, the agent that created it, and the action details.
+  llm: Verify an Asqav signature by its signature ID. Returns verification status, the signing agent name/ID, the action type, and the timestamp. No authentication needed.
 parameters:
   - name: signature_id
     type: string
     required: true
     label:
       en_US: Signature ID
-      zh_Hans: Signature ID
-      pt_BR: Signature ID
     human_description:
       en_US: The signature ID to verify (e.g. sig_abc123)
-      zh_Hans: The signature ID to verify (e.g. sig_abc123)
-      pt_BR: The signature ID to verify (e.g. sig_abc123)
-    llm_description: The asqav signature ID to verify. Usually starts with "sig_".
+    llm_description: The Asqav signature ID to verify. Usually starts with "sig_".
     form: llm
 extra:
   python:
     source: tools/verify_signature.py
+output_schema:
+  type: object
+  properties:
+    verified:
+      type: boolean
+      description: True if the signature is valid.
+    signature_id:
+      type: string
+      description: The verified signature ID.
+    agent_id:
+      type: string
+      description: ID of the agent that produced the signature.
+    agent_name:
+      type: string
+      description: Display name of the signing agent.
+    action_type:
+      type: string
+      description: The action type that was signed.
+    algorithm:
+      type: string
+      description: Signature algorithm, e.g. ML-DSA-65.
+    signed_at:
+      type: string
+      description: ISO 8601 timestamp of when the action was signed.
+    verification_url:
+      type: string
+      description: Public URL to verify the signature.