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/**
* Tests for Template System (Security & Escaping)
*/
import { describe, assert } from './test-runner.js';
import { html, raw, when, awaitThen, Component, defineComponent, flushSync } from '../../lib/framework.js';
import { instantiateTemplate } from '../../lib/core/template-renderer.js';
// Helper to render template and get HTML string
function renderToString(template) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
if (template._compiled) {
const { fragment } = instantiateTemplate(template._compiled, template._values || [], null);
container.appendChild(fragment);
} else {
// Fallback for string-based templates
container.innerHTML = template.toString();
}
return container.innerHTML;
}
// Helper to render template to container
function renderTemplate(template, container) {
if (template._compiled) {
const { fragment } = instantiateTemplate(template._compiled, template._values || [], null);
container.appendChild(fragment);
} else {
// Fallback for string-based templates
container.innerHTML = template.toString();
}
}
describe('Template Security', function(it) {
it('escapes HTML content', () => {
const userInput = '<script>alert("xss")</script>';
const result = html`<div>${userInput}</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
// Text content should be escaped (browser converts < back to < in textContent)
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
assert.equal(container.querySelector('div').textContent, '<script>alert("xss")</script>', 'Should escape < and >');
assert.ok(!str.includes('<script>alert'), 'Should not contain unescaped script tags');
});
it('escapes HTML attributes', () => {
const userInput = '"><script>alert("xss")</script>';
const result = html`<div title="${userInput}">content</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
// The quotes should be escaped, preventing attribute injection
// Note: ><script will appear in the output, but with escaped quotes ("><script)
// This is safe because the < and > don't have special meaning inside attribute values
assert.ok(!str.includes('"><script'), 'Should not allow unescaped attribute injection');
assert.ok(str.includes('"') || str.includes('"'), 'Should escape quotes in attribute');
});
it('sanitizes URLs in href', () => {
const maliciousUrl = 'javascript:alert(document.cookie)';
const result = html`<a href="${maliciousUrl}">Link</a>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(!str.includes('javascript:'), 'Should block javascript: URLs');
// Blocked URLs become about:blank, not '': an empty href resolves to the
// current document, so a blocked link would reload the page (or re-enter
// its own document inside a frame) instead of going nowhere.
assert.ok(str.includes('href="about:blank"'), 'Blocked href should be about:blank');
});
it('sanitizes URLs in src', () => {
const maliciousUrl = 'data:text/html,<script>alert("xss")</script>';
const result = html`<img src="${maliciousUrl}">`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(!str.includes('data:'), 'Should block data: URLs');
});
it('blocks data: URLs with scriptable media types', () => {
const svgUrl = '';
const result = html`<a href="${svgUrl}">Link</a>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(!str.includes('data:image/svg'), 'Should block data:image/svg+xml (can script on navigation)');
});
it('allows blob: URLs', () => {
const blobUrl = 'blob:https://example.com/4f3b2a1c-0000-1111-2222-333344445555';
const result = html`<img src="${blobUrl}">`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(str.includes('blob:'), 'Should allow blob: URLs (same-origin createObjectURL only)');
});
it('allows data: URLs for safe media types', () => {
const pngUrl = '';
const result = html`<img src="${pngUrl}">`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(str.includes('data:image/png'), 'Should allow data:image/png');
const audioUrl = 'data:audio/mpeg;base64,AAAA';
const result2 = html`<audio src="${audioUrl}"></audio>`;
const str2 = renderToString(result2);
assert.ok(str2.includes('data:audio/mpeg'), 'Should allow data:audio/*');
});
it('allows safe URL schemes', () => {
const httpUrl = 'https://example.com';
const result = html`<a href="${httpUrl}">Link</a>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(str.includes('https://example.com'), 'Should allow HTTPS URLs');
const mailtoUrl = 'mailto:user@example.com';
const result2 = html`<a href="${mailtoUrl}">Email</a>`;
const str2 = renderToString(result2);
assert.ok(str2.includes('mailto:'), 'Should allow mailto: URLs');
});
it('handles raw HTML explicitly', () => {
const trustedHTML = '<p>Trusted content</p>';
const result = html`<div>${raw(trustedHTML)}</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(str.includes('<p>Trusted content</p>'), 'Should include raw HTML');
});
it('safely handles Unicode including BOM', () => {
// With DOM-based rendering, BOM and other Unicode chars are safe
// They go into textContent, not innerHTML, so can't cause XSS
const weirdInput = '\uFEFF<script>';
const result = html`<div>${weirdInput}</div>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const div = container.querySelector('div');
// Content should be text, not executed as script
assert.ok(div.textContent.includes('<script>'), 'Script tag should be text content');
assert.ok(!div.querySelector('script'), 'Should not create actual script element');
});
it('escapes special characters in content', () => {
const special = '& < > " \' /';
const result = html`<div>${special}</div>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const textContent = container.querySelector('div').textContent;
assert.equal(textContent, '& < > " \' /', 'Should escape &');
});
it('handles null and undefined', () => {
const result1 = html`<div>${null}</div>`;
const result2 = html`<div>${undefined}</div>`;
const container1 = document.createElement('div');
const container2 = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result1, container1);
renderTemplate(result2, container2);
// null/undefined should not render any visible content
assert.equal(container1.querySelector('div').textContent, '', 'Should handle null');
assert.equal(container2.querySelector('div').textContent, '', 'Should handle undefined');
});
it('handles numbers and booleans', () => {
const result = html`<div>${42} ${true} ${false}</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(str.includes('42'), 'Should handle numbers');
// Booleans might be converted to strings or not shown at all (both valid)
assert.ok(str.includes('true') || str.includes('false') || str.includes('42'), 'Should handle primitive values');
});
it('leaves HTML-entity-encoded schemes inert without decoding them', () => {
// Replaces an older test that asserted these were decoded and blocked.
// URLs are set as attributes/properties and never re-parsed as HTML, so
// ':' stays five literal characters and never becomes a colon --
// there is no scheme here, just an odd relative path. Decoding a fixed
// entity list was defense against a parser that isn't in the path, and
// was incomplete regardless (':' and ':' also mean ':').
const BASE = 'https://app.example.com/dir/page';
const encoded = [
'javascript:alert(1)',
'javascript:alert(1)',
'javascript:alert(1)',
'javascript:alert(1)', // leading zero - never matched the old list
'javascript:alert(1)', // padded hex - never matched the old list
];
for (const url of encoded) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
const resolved = new URL(attr, BASE);
assert.equal(resolved.protocol, 'https:',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} should stay an inert relative path`);
assert.equal(resolved.host, 'app.example.com',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} should stay on the document origin`);
}
});
it('returns about:blank for blocked URLs but empty for absent ones', () => {
// The distinction matters: about:blank is the inert replacement for a
// URL we refused, but an author who bound nothing should get no
// attribute at all -- not a navigable about:blank.
const blocked = ['javascript:alert(1)', 'vbscript:msgbox(1)', 'data:text/html,x'];
for (const url of blocked) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
assert.equal(container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href'), 'about:blank',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} should be replaced with about:blank`);
}
for (const url of ['', null, undefined]) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
assert.ok(attr === null || attr === '',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} should not become about:blank (got ${JSON.stringify(attr)})`);
}
});
// --- C0-control scheme obfuscation ---------------------------------
// The URL spec strips ALL leading C0-control-or-space (U+0000-U+0020)
// before parsing, but JS `\s` only covers \t\n\v\f\r. If sanitizeUrl
// relied on `\s` alone to strip whitespace, "\x01javascript:alert(1)"
// would fail the scheme regex (doesn't start with [a-zA-Z]), be
// classified as a harmless relative URL, and pass through -- then the
// browser would strip the \x01 and execute it. normalizeInput() strips
// the C0 range up front, which is what closes this. These tests pin
// that down per byte so it can't regress invisibly.
// Render an href and ask the browser what it actually resolves to.
// Using the real URL parser (rather than string matching) means the
// assertion holds regardless of which characters the parser chooses to
// strip or normalize.
function resolvedProtocol(url) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
// null/'' = attribute dropped; about:blank = blocked sentinel. All inert.
if (attr === null || attr === '' || attr === 'about:blank') return null;
try {
return new URL(attr, document.baseURI).protocol;
} catch {
return null; // unparseable == not navigable
}
}
it('blocks "\\x01javascript:alert(1)" (leading C0 control hides the scheme)', () => {
assert.equal(resolvedProtocol('\x01javascript:alert(1)'), null,
'Leading \\x01 must not smuggle javascript: past the scheme check');
});
it('blocks javascript: behind every leading C0 control byte', () => {
// 0x00-0x1F, plus space and DEL. \t\n\v\f\r are covered by `\s`;
// 0x00-0x08 and 0x0E-0x1F are the range `\s` misses.
for (let code = 0x00; code <= 0x20; code++) {
const url = String.fromCharCode(code) + 'javascript:alert(1)';
assert.notEqual(resolvedProtocol(url), 'javascript:',
`Leading \\x${code.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')} must not yield a javascript: URL`);
}
// DEL is not stripped by the URL parser, so it stays a relative
// path -- but assert it never resolves to javascript: either.
assert.notEqual(resolvedProtocol('\x7fjavascript:alert(1)'), 'javascript:',
'Leading \\x7f must not yield a javascript: URL');
});
it('blocks C0 controls embedded inside the scheme', () => {
const payloads = [
'java\x01script:alert(1)', // mid-scheme
'javascript\x01:alert(1)', // before the colon
'javascript:\x01alert(1)', // after the colon
'\x01\x02\x03javascript:alert(1)', // several leading controls
'\x0Bjavascript:alert(1)', // vertical tab (in `\s`)
'\x0Cjavascript:alert(1)', // form feed (in `\s`)
];
for (const url of payloads) {
assert.notEqual(resolvedProtocol(url), 'javascript:',
`Should block ${JSON.stringify(url)}`);
}
});
it('strips leading C0 controls without breaking safe URLs', () => {
// Guards against over-correcting: a fix that blocks anything
// containing a control char would break legitimate input.
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${'\x01\x02https://example.com/ok'}">Link</a>`, container);
assert.equal(container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href'), 'https://example.com/ok',
'Leading controls should be stripped, leaving the safe URL intact');
});
// --- "no scheme" is not "same origin" ------------------------------
// Canary, not a vulnerability report. URL sanitization answers "can this
// execute code", not "where does this point" -- it allows http/https to any
// host, so 'https://evil.com' is a legitimate pass and origin is out of
// scope by construction. These host-swap forms therefore pass by design.
// What this pins down is that they are NOT relative: if anything later
// wants a same-origin guarantee, it must compare resolved origins rather
// than test for a missing scheme, and these are the cases that would slip
// through the latter.
it('documents that scheme-less URLs can still resolve cross-origin', () => {
const BASE = 'https://app.example.com/dir/page';
const hostSwaps = [
'//evil.com/x', // protocol-relative
'\\\\evil.com/x', // both slashes folded (\\evil.com/x)
'/\\evil.com/x', // mixed (/\evil.com/x)
'\\/evil.com/x', // mixed (\/evil.com/x)
];
for (const url of hostSwaps) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
assert.ok(attr, `${JSON.stringify(url)} is expected to pass sanitizeUrl`);
// The scheme is safe...
assert.equal(new URL(attr, BASE).protocol, 'https:',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} must not yield a script-capable scheme`);
// ...but the host is NOT ours. This is the trap.
assert.equal(new URL(attr, BASE).host, 'evil.com',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} resolves cross-origin - do not treat ` +
`"no scheme" as "same origin"`);
}
});
it('keeps genuinely relative URLs on the document origin', () => {
const BASE = 'https://app.example.com/dir/page';
// The contrast case: these really are relative, and stay same-origin.
for (const url of ['relative/path', '/abs/path', '../up', '#frag', '?q=1']) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
assert.equal(new URL(attr, BASE).host, 'app.example.com',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} should stay on the document origin`);
}
});
it('does not let a percent-encoded scheme through as a relative URL', () => {
// The URL parser does not percent-decode the scheme, so these stay
// inert paths rather than becoming javascript:. Pinning it down because
// a well-meaning "decode before checking" change would break it.
const payloads = [
'%6a%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74:alert(1)',
'javascript%3aalert(1)',
'java%09script:alert(1)',
'java%0ascript:alert(1)',
':alert(1)',
'://evil.com',
];
for (const url of payloads) {
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(html`<a href="${url}">Link</a>`, container);
const attr = container.querySelector('a').getAttribute('href');
const proto = attr ? new URL(attr, 'https://app.example.com/dir/page').protocol : null;
assert.notEqual(proto, 'javascript:',
`${JSON.stringify(url)} must not resolve to javascript:`);
}
});
it('handles boolean true in boolean attributes', () => {
const result = html`<option selected="${true}">Test</option>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const option = container.querySelector('option');
assert.ok(option.selected, 'Should add attribute with empty value for true');
});
it('handles boolean false in boolean attributes', () => {
const result = html`<option selected="${false}">Test</option>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const option = container.querySelector('option');
assert.ok(!option.selected, 'Should remove attribute for false');
});
it('handles undefined in boolean attributes', () => {
const result = html`<option selected="${undefined}">Test</option>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const option = container.querySelector('option');
assert.ok(!option.selected, 'Should remove attribute for undefined');
});
it('handles null in boolean attributes', () => {
const result = html`<option selected="${null}">Test</option>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const option = container.querySelector('option');
assert.ok(!option.selected, 'Should remove attribute for null');
});
it('handles string values in boolean attributes', () => {
const result = html`<option selected="${'true'}">Test</option>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const option = container.querySelector('option');
// String "true" gets coerced to boolean true for boolean properties
// The selected property is set, and browser reflects it
assert.ok(option.selected, 'Should set selected property when string "true" is passed');
});
it('handles undefined in any attribute', () => {
const result = html`<div class="${undefined}" data-foo="${undefined}">Test</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
assert.ok(!str.includes('class='), 'Should remove class attribute for undefined');
assert.ok(!str.includes('data-foo='), 'Should remove data-foo attribute for undefined');
});
it('handles multiple boolean attributes conditionally', () => {
const isChecked = true;
const isDisabled = false;
const result = html`<input type="checkbox" checked="${isChecked}" disabled="${isDisabled}">`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const input = container.querySelector('input');
assert.ok(input.checked, 'Should include checked');
assert.ok(!input.disabled, 'Should not include disabled');
});
});
describe('Template Security - Symbol Protection', function(it) {
it('prevents __raw__ spoofing from JSON', () => {
// Malicious JSON trying to inject as trusted HTML
// With DOM-based rendering, toString() result goes to textContent (safe)
const maliciousData = {
__raw__: true,
toString: () => '<script>alert("xss")</script>'
};
const result = html`<div>${maliciousData}</div>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
const div = container.querySelector('div');
// toString() is called but result is text content, not HTML
// The script tag appears as text, not as an executable element
assert.ok(div.textContent.includes('<script>'), 'Script text should appear as text content');
assert.ok(!div.querySelector('script'), 'Should not create actual script element');
});
it('prevents __html__ spoofing from JSON', () => {
// Malicious JSON trying to bypass escaping
const maliciousData = {
__html__: true,
toString: () => '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
};
const result = html`<div>${maliciousData}</div>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
// Should be escaped, not treated as safe HTML
assert.ok(!container.innerHTML.includes('<img src=x'), 'Should escape img tag');
assert.ok(!container.innerHTML.includes('<img src=x'), 'Should not allow unescaped img');
});
it('allows actual raw() to work', () => {
// Legitimate use of raw()
const trusted = raw('<b>Bold</b>');
const result = html`<div>${trusted}</div>`;
const str = renderToString(result);
// Should pass through unescaped
assert.ok(str.includes('<b>Bold</b>'), 'Should allow raw HTML from raw()');
});
});
describe('Template - Function Event Handlers', function(it) {
it('allows function references in on-* attributes', () => {
const handler = () => {};
const result = html`<button on-click="${handler}">Click</button>`;
const container = document.createElement('div');
renderTemplate(result, container);
// Compiled templates store functions directly in tree (no __EVENT_ in string)
// String-based creates __EVENT_ markers
// Both systems should handle the button element
const button = container.querySelector('button');
assert.ok(button, 'Should create button element');
assert.ok(result._compiled || renderToString(result).includes('__EVENT_'), 'Should handle event (compiled or string-based)');
});
it('blocks non-function values in on-* attributes', () => {
const maliciousString = 'alert(1)';
const result = html`<button on-click="${maliciousString}">Click</button>`;
const str = result.toString();
// Should NOT include the malicious string
assert.ok(!str.includes('alert(1)'), 'Should block string interpolation in event handlers');
// Compiled templates omit non-function event values, string-based uses on-click=""
assert.ok(!str.includes('alert(1)'), 'Should block malicious code');
});
it('stores function references with crypto-random IDs', () => {
const handler1 = () => {};
const handler2 = () => {};
const result1 = html`<button on-click="${handler1}">Button 1</button>`;
const result2 = html`<button on-click="${handler2}">Button 2</button>`;
// Compiled templates store functions directly (verified via different tests)
// String-based uses __EVENT_ markers with crypto-random IDs
if (result1._compiled) {
// Compiled template: functions are in the tree, not string
assert.ok(result1._compiled && result2._compiled, 'Compiled templates handle functions directly');
} else {
// String-based: check for __EVENT_ markers
const str1 = result1.toString();
const str2 = result2.toString();
const match1 = str1.match(/__EVENT_([a-f0-9]{6}-\d+)__/i);
const match2 = str2.match(/__EVENT_([a-f0-9]{6}-\d+)__/i);
assert.ok(match1, 'Should create valid event marker format for handler1');
assert.ok(match2, 'Should create valid event marker format for handler2');
assert.ok(match1[1] !== match2[1], 'Event IDs should be different');
}
});
it('allows method name strings in on-* attributes (legacy)', () => {
// Method names (string) should still be blocked for security
// but the warning should suggest using method names without ${} instead
const methodName = 'handleClick';
const result = html`<button on-click="${methodName}">Click</button>`;
const str = result.toString();
// Should block the interpolation
assert.ok(!str.includes('handleClick'), 'Should not allow string interpolation');
// Compiled templates omit non-function events, string-based uses on-click=""
assert.ok(!str.includes('handleClick'), 'Should block string in event handler');
});
});
describe('awaitThen Helper (Component-Based)', function(it) {
it('returns html template with x-await-then component', () => {
const promise = Promise.resolve({ name: 'Test' });
const result = awaitThen(
promise,
data => html`<div>${data.name}</div>`,
html`<span>Loading...</span>`
);
assert.ok(result, 'Should return result');
assert.ok(result._compiled, 'Should return compiled template');
});
it('renders x-await-then component', () => {
const promise = Promise.resolve({ name: 'Test' });
const result = awaitThen(
promise,
data => html`<div>${data.name}</div>`,
html`<span>Loading...</span>`
);
const container = document.createElement('div');
const { fragment } = instantiateTemplate(result._compiled, result._values || [], null);
container.appendChild(fragment);
assert.ok(container.querySelector('x-await-then'), 'Should render x-await-then element');
});
it('passes all props to x-await-then', () => {
const promise = Promise.resolve({ name: 'Test' });
const thenFn = data => html`<div>${data.name}</div>`;
const pendingContent = html`<span>Loading...</span>`;
const catchFn = error => html`<span>${error.message}</span>`;
const result = awaitThen(promise, thenFn, pendingContent, catchFn);
// Check that values array contains the props
assert.ok(result._values, 'Should have values');
assert.equal(result._values.length, 4, 'Should have 4 values (promise, then, pending, catch)');
assert.equal(result._values[0], promise, 'First value should be promise');
assert.equal(result._values[1], thenFn, 'Second value should be then function');
assert.ok(result._values[2]._compiled, 'Third value should be pending content (html template)');
assert.equal(result._values[3], catchFn, 'Fourth value should be catch function');
});
it('handles null catch content', () => {
const promise = Promise.resolve({ name: 'Test' });
const result = awaitThen(
promise,
data => html`<div>${data.name}</div>`,
html`<span>Loading...</span>`
// No catch content
);
assert.ok(result, 'Should return result');
assert.equal(result._values[3], null, 'Fourth value should be null for catch');
});
});
import { memoEach, each } from '../../lib/core/template.js';
describe('memoEach Helper', function(it) {
it('returns empty result for null/undefined array', () => {
const result = memoEach(null, () => html`<div></div>`, x => x.id);
assert.ok(result._compiled, 'Should return compiled template');
assert.equal(result._compiled.children.length, 0, 'Should have no children');
});
it('falls back to each() when no keyFn provided', () => {
const items = [{ id: 1 }, { id: 2 }];
const result = memoEach(items, item => html`<div>${item.id}</div>`);
assert.ok(result._compiled, 'Should return compiled template');
});
it('returns marker object for slot-level caching', () => {
// memoEach now returns a marker that template-renderer handles
// The actual caching happens at the DOM slot level, not in template evaluation
const array = [{ id: 1, name: 'a' }, { id: 2, name: 'b' }];
const mapFn = item => html`<div>${item.name}</div>`;
const keyFn = item => item.id;
const result = memoEach(array, mapFn, keyFn);
// Should return a marker object
assert.ok(result._compiled, 'Should have _compiled');
assert.equal(result._compiled.type, 'memoEach', 'Should be memoEach type');
assert.equal(result._array, array, 'Should store array reference');
assert.equal(result._mapFn, mapFn, 'Should store mapFn');
assert.equal(result._keyFn, keyFn, 'Should store keyFn');
});
it('supports explicit cache parameter for backward compatibility', () => {
const array = [{ id: 1 }];
const explicitCache = new Map();
const result = memoEach(array, item => html`<div></div>`, item => item.id, explicitCache);
// Should store explicit cache reference
assert.equal(result._explicitCache, explicitCache, 'Should store explicit cache');
});
});
describe('Template - style binding', function(it) {
it('a style withdrawn on update leaves no attribute behind', () => {
// Blink re-serialises a CSSOM-written inline style into the attribute
// lazily; removeAttribute on an unsynchronised one left style="" (and
// [style] selectors matching). A fresh render of null never had the
// attribute, so the update must not either.
class TplStyleProbe extends Component {
state = { s: 'color: red' };
template() { return html`<div style="${this.state.s}"></div>`; }
}
defineComponent('tpl-style-probe', TplStyleProbe);
const host = document.createElement('tpl-style-probe');
document.body.appendChild(host);
const div = host.querySelector('div');
assert.equal(div.getAttribute('style'), 'color: red;', 'string style applied');
flushSync(() => { host.state.s = null; });
assert.equal(div.hasAttribute('style'), false,
'withdrawing the style must remove the attribute, not empty it');
host.remove();
});
});