None of the four KRDPASS Auth SDKs writes an access token, ID token, or refresh token to disk. Every result is returned to your code in memory and nothing is cached, so uninstalling the SDK layer removes no stored credential.
That is deliberate. Storage policy depends on your threat model, your backup posture, and whether you gate access behind device authentication, and the SDK cannot make that decision for you.
It also means persistence is your responsibility. If you keep a refresh token across launches, use the platform's encrypted store with the settings below.
Encrypt the token with a key held in the Android Keystore, and store the ciphertext. The key never leaves the Keystore, so a copied file is useless.
Do not use plain SharedPreferences: it is world-readable on a rooted device
and is included in cloud backups by default.
Do not reach for androidx.security:security-crypto either. Every API in it
(EncryptedSharedPreferences, EncryptedFile, MasterKey, MasterKeys) was
deprecated in 1.1.0, in favour of the platform APIs and direct Android Keystore
use. It still works, but it is not what to build on now.
When the token grants access to sensitive citizen data, require user
authentication to unlock the key (setUserAuthenticationRequired on the
KeyGenParameterSpec).
Use the Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly.
The ThisDeviceOnly suffix is the part that matters: it excludes the item from
iCloud Keychain sync, so a compromised Apple ID does not yield the token. Do not
use kSecAttrAccessibleAlways or any accessibility class without the
ThisDeviceOnly suffix.
Use flutter_secure_storage, setting the iOS accessibility class explicitly:
const storage = FlutterSecureStorage(
iOptions: IOSOptions(accessibility: KeychainAccessibility.first_unlock_this_device),
);first_unlock_this_device is the part you have to ask for. Without it the iOS
item syncs to iCloud Keychain and the refresh token leaves the device.
The Android side needs no options as of flutter_secure_storage 10.x: the
default AndroidOptions() wraps the key with
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding and stores with AES/GCM/NoPadding.
Do not pass AndroidOptions(encryptedSharedPreferences: true): 10.0.0 moved off
the deprecated Jetpack Security library and removed that parameter outright, so
it is a compile error, not a deprecation warning.
Use expo-secure-store (Expo) or react-native-keychain (bare).
Do not use AsyncStorage. It is unencrypted plain text on both platforms and is
included in device backups.