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Commit 241cae7
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Rename the jailed-command network values for clarity (pre-1.0, no shims):
- sandbox.tool_network: blocked|carveouts|allowed -> block|only_explicit_states|allow
- per-state allow_network: bool -> "auto" (default) | "allow" | "block"
The tri-state fixes a real imprecision: a plain bool could not distinguish "this
tool doesn't need network" (default) from "this tool must be isolated". Now a
tool reaches the network iff it sets allow_network = "allow" (explicit-only,
auditable: grep the one value to find every networked tool). "auto" is
best-effort isolation (tolerated on hardened, which can't isolate per-tool);
"block" REQUIRES isolation and is refused on hardened. This replaces the
previous hardened+allowed warning with a precise refusal only when an explicit
"block" (or the operator's tool_network = "block"/"only_explicit_states") can't
be honored. The engine resolves the tri-state to a bool grant
(allow_network == "allow"); the World/jail interface stays bool.
Security review note: defaults unchanged and still safe (tool_network = "block",
allow_network = "auto" — no jailed network). The config validator still pins
tool_network = "allow" to agent_network = "open". Names only; no behavior change
to the agent egress broker or the jail.
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