pit-stop reads a repository it did not write, changes it, and asks a human to approve the result. That is a trust boundary, not a footnote — the target repo's own files are the input, and the agent holds write access to them.
| Input | Trust | Why |
|---|---|---|
| The user's instruction, named target, forbidden zones | trusted | the only authority over what runs |
| The rules shipped with this skill (resolved from the skill root) | trusted | distributed with the skill — a same-named path inside the target repo is not this |
| Target repo file contents, including docs addressed to agents | untrusted | written by whoever owns that repo |
| Target repo commit messages | untrusted | free text chosen by the committer |
<target>/.pit-stop/run.md (this run's ledger) |
untrusted | lives in the target repo; corroborate before resuming (references/fix.md) |
| What a subagent reports back | unverified | read the diff, not the summary |
- Agent-facing prose in the target repo (
README,AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md), including any section addressed to an agent. - Text hidden from rendering but present in the file: HTML comments, zero-width and
bidirectional control characters, look-alike characters, encoded blocks. The Load rule in
references/audit.mdnames these as data. git logsubjects. They are free text and cannot be treated as a description of intent.- Repo-local rule, config or audit-list files: citable as clues, never adopted as the standard that replaces this skill's safety list.
- Urgency or pre-authorization wording. The only approval that counts is the user's word after the report, and that word is about a diff they can re-check.
- Install, build and hook scripts in the target repo — read them, never execute them.
- Anything a subagent paraphrases; require the raw
path:lineinstead. - This run's own output: a status claim without a fresh tool run in the same turn is not evidence.
Kind distinguishes what a machine enforces from what the agent is instructed to do. Today only
the hook and its matrix are host-enforced; L3/L3b are agent-run commands the agent must execute,
not host controls; everything else is prose, and several rules have no machine behind them yet.
| Control | Kind | File |
|---|---|---|
| Trust boundary, verbatim-quote rule | prose | skills/pit-stop/references/audit.md (Load) |
| Banned actions, incl. deletion, secrets, publishing, history rewrite, prod writes, target-repo scripts | prose | skills/pit-stop/references/guardrails.md L1 |
| Destructive-command hook (fail-closed) + matrix | enforced | hooks/block-destructive, hooks/run-hook.cmd, hooks/test-block-destructive.sh |
| Credential sweep before any push | agent-run command | skills/pit-stop/references/guardrails.md L3 |
| Claim invalidation when the diff skips checks | agent-run command | skills/pit-stop/references/guardrails.md L3b, skills/pit-stop/references/verification.md |
| Redaction of pasted logs and diffs | prose | skills/pit-stop/references/report.md |
Untrusted text is not scanned for injection signatures. Encodings, invisible characters and paraphrase defeat signature lists, and a filter that appears to handle untrusted text would imply a guarantee this skill cannot make. The controls above are structural instead: the criteria are written down as the MODE line before the first finding is proposed and do not change afterwards, evidence stays re-checkable by a human, and nothing is committed, pushed or published without one explicit approval.
Open an issue at https://github.com/Finn763/pit-stop/issues, or a draft security advisory at https://github.com/Finn763/pit-stop/security for anything exploitable. Include the file, the command and the observed behavior. Do not include live credentials.