Implemented backend slice, 2026-10-17. Notifications owns this registry behind Installations and InstallationProofs ports, with private domain state and focused command/query handlers. It selects memory/PostgreSQL, not an OS/cloud SDK.
An Identity access credential authenticates the current principal/session through credential resolution v2. A client-owned installation UUID names a local installation. A separate installation key proves possession of its binding: i1. plus canonical unpadded base64url of 32 random bytes. Clients must generate it cryptographically and keep it in secure local storage, partitioned by deployment and app. Only its namespace-separated SHA-256 digest is stored. An installation ID alone grants no access or rebinding authority.
The opaque push token is a fourth value: a delivery address, never authentication or installation proof. The registry accepts 1–4096 printable non-space ASCII bytes unchanged. It does not verify provider issuance or infer a fixed APNs/FCM length. The local route policy selects apns/fcm, a 1–128 character application key and sandbox/production; sandbox is accepted only for APNs. A future selected provider adapter must map an allowlisted application route to actual provider credentials, validate provider encoding and reject unsupported routes before sending.
No raw token, installation key, key digest, principal ID or session ID appears in public installation views. Spec/snapshot/mutation diagnostic formatting is redacted. Private routing tokens are stored in the module's protected metadata store, in plaintext for now; at-rest envelope encryption/key management is not implemented.
Create admits an installation ID and registration_id, both client UUIDs. Update requires the current ETag through If-Match and a fresh registration_id. It may rotate a token or explicitly rebind the installation to the authenticated session. Possession of the installation key plus the current version authorizes rebinding, even between principals. GET requires an authenticated Identity session and the installation key; it exposes sanitized route/version/checkpoint/times and whether the caller owns the current binding, without identifying another owner.
Unregister requires key, current owning session and If-Match. It disables the binding, erases its raw token and frees its target reservation atomically. Repeating unregister on the same session's already-disabled record returns current state without changing its version. An old session cannot unregister a newer binding; an old version cannot remove a same-session token rotation. Wrong proof and absent installation have the same not-found outcome. There is no bulk device listing.
Only one registered installation may reserve a (provider, application, environment, token) target. The index uses a namespace-separated digest, not a public hash. A conflict rolls back the whole registration. An expired conflicting registration can be retired in the same transaction that claims its target elsewhere. Proof loss cannot bypass a live reservation; automatic proof recovery is not supplied.
registration_id is the current accepted registration checkpoint. It is not a historical receipt or permanent idempotency ledger. Clients use a new random UUID for each new registration intent and never reuse an old ID after intervening changes. Reusing the current checkpoint or a stale version returns conflict. After uncertain acknowledgement, GET can inspect the current checkpoint/binding and ETag; it cannot prove superseded history. There is no automatic retry/replay or Idempotency-Key support. Registration expiry is the captured session lifetime. registered describes metadata state; it does not attest current push eligibility.
Notifications consumes identity.session.revoked.v1 as notifications.identity. Its own receiver admits producer/name, omitted account scope, actor/principal, session ID, version and reason, then calls RetireSession with owned app input. It never imports Identity domain/application/store or joins Identity tables.
The receiver commits a fingerprinted inbox marker, session tombstone and matching token erasure together. It records tombstones even without a current installation, so a delayed in-flight register cannot restore a revoked session. Cleanup matches the currently bound principal/session; a late old-session event leaves a rebound installation alone. Same-event input is a no-op; conflicting input is a failure. Sign-out and refresh-reuse share this path. Renewal retains the same session ID.
Credential admission and registry commit are separate boundaries. Revocation cleanup is eventual through the existing leased Identity outbox; it is not an atomic transaction with Identity. A future sender must recheck current session eligibility and binding/version before external delivery, and define its remaining check/send race. Metadata registration alone makes no immediate push suppression or external exactly-once guarantee.
Memory serializes changes under its owned mutex and bounds installation records, revoked sessions and source markers to 10,000 each. PostgreSQL uses Notifications' existing pool/schema and immutable 0002 migration. A registry-wide guard serializes proof/CAS/target changes and revocation; this favors a clear foundation over hot-row scaling. No capability/network call runs under that guard. Inbox delivery uses its existing separate per-scope guards. No foreign transactions or scheduled goroutines.
Tokens are cleared on successful unregister, session retirement or conflicting expired-target reclamation. Disabled records, proof digests, tombstones and inbox markers are retained. Retention/erasure and active-session target discovery are future policies. OS permission/token collection, offline unlink, provider send queues/adapters and system notification UI remain separate capabilities. Local-only sign-out is not a server revocation.
Swift/Kotlin Services expose InstallationIdentity, DeliveryTarget, sanitized InstallationRecord, InstallationVault and InstallationRegistry ports. HTTP adapters perform one attempt through an injected exact-lease client. Reads carry proof in X-Installation-Key; registration bodies carry the independent delivery token. Response admission checks IDs, route policy, booleans, safe integer version, matching ETag, real UTC timestamps and mutation intent. Private/unknown view fields are rejected. A not-found read means no visible record; it never rotates the key.
InstallationVault serializes load-or-create and persists a cryptographically random UUID/32-byte proof before returning it for networking. Namespace it by deployment authority and application, independently of principal/account. Token or environment changes reuse that identity. Catalog Device adapters use a non-synchronizing ThisDeviceOnly Keychain item or Keystore AES-GCM/AtomicFile in no-backup storage. Memory is an explicit process-only selection. Corrupt records, lost encryption keys and locked/unavailable storage fail without implicit reset or plaintext fallback. Secret-bearing model diagnostic formatting is redacted.
InstallationController owns current-state reconciliation on the UI executor. Every bind cancels/increments its generation, clears the old record and reads through the new lease. This includes renewal and account selection even though the physical installation identity stays unchanged. Rebinding a client performs no automatic POST/PUT/DELETE. Unbinding/closing drops remote presentation but does not erase secure identity or unregister a background-capable target.
Each explicit registration uses a fresh registration UUID and the last read revision, if any. A failed/unconfirmed mutation requires readback before another write; there is no automatic replay, durable pending command or receipt claim. The original target is captured for one attempt; a later token update is a new explicit intent after readback. GET observes current state only. A stale owner cannot publish results or begin work through a no-longer-current HTTP lease.
Sign-out invalidates native work and invokes existing Identity revocation; its server event retires matching registrations. Native sign-out sends no delayed DELETE under an old lease. Failed/offline revocation does not promise immediate server retirement; absolute session expiry remains relevant. The proof stays available so a later login can explicitly rebind. This registry does not request notification permission, obtain OS tokens, attest provider tokens or send push.